April 23, 2014 Science Delusion

 The Science Delusion

A conversation with Curtis White   Click here for a pdf version

Curtis White pulls no punches. To readers who see in Buddhism little room for spirited debate, White’s unapologetic bluntness may seem unexpected or even jarring. But for White—Distinguished Professor Emeritus of English at Illinois State University, novelist, and author of several works of criticism including the 2003 international bestseller The Middle Mind: Why Americans Don’t Think for Themselves—there is too much at stake in our current intellectual climate to indulge in timid discussion.

White’s latest book, The Science Delusion: Asking the Big Questions in a Culture of Easy Answers, strikes out at a nimble opponent, one frequently sighted yet so elusive it often seems to dodge just out of view: scientism. White identifies scientism as an unwarranted triumphalism based on unproven premises—such as the claim that science has got the world nailed down (or soon will, anyway), that the answer to all of our human problems lies in the discovery of natural laws, or that submitting to a scientific perspective is a choiceless imperative dictated by impersonal facts. To White, this attitude is not only wrongheaded, it is dangerous and wreaks social, cultural, and political damage.

The Science Delusion takes dual aim: at scientists and critics who proclaim themselves “enemies of religion” and at certain neuroscientists and thought leaders in the popular press whose neuro-enthusiasm, White thinks, is adding spin to the facts. What these science advocates share, he says, is both an ideology promoting the scientific worldview as the single valid understanding of human phenomena and also a set of assumptions, “many of which,” he writes, “are dubious if not outright deluded.” But for White, the debate over knowledge claims is a side skirmish. There is a more urgent battle to fight that becomes evident when he asks, “In whose interest do these science popularizers and provocateurs write? And to what end?”

White writes at a moment when the arts and humanities are struggling for survival on campuses across America as they are increasingly eclipsed by the “STEM” disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and math). In White’s view, what we are witnessing is a takeover, on the part of science, of the multiple narratives of what it means to be human—narratives that have flourished throughout Western history in religion, art, literature, and philosophy. Scientism comes with its own narrative, which White puts like this: “We are not ‘free’; we are chemical expressions of our DNA and our neurons. We cannot will anything, because our brains do our acting for us. We are like computers or systems, and so is nature.” When this is what we think we are, we become quiescent cogs readily manipulated by societal forces. In White’s view, once scientism rewrites our story so that the things human beings care about—like love, wonder, presence, or play—are reduced to atoms, genes, or neurons, human lives become easy prey to corporate and political interests. We become “mere functions within systems.” White wants us to wake up and recognize that this view is not scientific discovery, it is ideology. Mistaking one for the other has profound consequences, “not just for knowledge but even more importantly for how we live.”

Western Buddhists, engaged as we are in adapting an Asian religious tradition, generally agree that it is valuable to try to understand how Buddhism has been shaped by its host cultures in Asia. But shining that light of understanding on ourselves is a much more difficult proposition. It is hard to see what presumptions we bring to the project precisely because they are our own and not someone else’s. In striking hard at some of our most deeply ingrained assumptions, White brings them to our attention. Whether or not we agree with his critique isn’t the point. White isn’t looking for agreement. He wants to challenge our complacency, and in so doing, to shift the very framework within which we determine our agreements and disagreements.

–Linda Heuman, Contributing Editor

Your latest book is entitled The Science Delusion, which is clearly a response to the title of Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion. What is the science delusion, and what are its implications for living a spiritually meaningful life? There is no singular science delusion. One of the biggest challenges in writing a book that tries to question the role that science plays in our culture is being visible at all. So the title is a provocation, although an earnest one.

What I criticize is science as ideology, or scientism, for short. The problem with scientism is that it attempts to reduce every human matter to its own terms. So artistic creativity is merely a function of neurons and chemicals, religion is the result of the God gene, and faith is hardwired into our genetic makeup.

Not surprisingly, “spirit” is a forbidden word. Science writers tend to reduce believers to fundamentalists and the history of religion to a series of criminal anecdotes. Richard Dawkins is, and Christopher Hitchens was, particularly culpable in this regard. Any subtle consideration of the meaning of spirit is left out. But of course the history of religious thought is quite subtle, as anyone familiar with Buddhist philosophy knows well. Another good example is the legacy of Christian existential thinkers beginning with Kierkegaard: it seems to me shamefully dishonest not to acknowledge such work.

Both scientism and religious fundamentalism answer the human need for certainty in a rapidly shifting and disorientingly pluralistic world. To what extent are they in the same business? As your question suggests, the drama of the confrontation between religious fundamentalism and scientism is a confrontation between things that are more alike than they know. Both fundamentalism and scientism try to limit and close down, not open up. Science tends to be vulnerable to the “closed-in” syndrome. Scientists value curiosity, and they value open-mindedness, but they are often insensible to alternative ways of thinking about the world. It’s really difficult for them to get outside of their own worldview. This problem is probably created by the way in which we educate scientists. It seems to me scientists need to have a better background in history and the history of ideas, especially if prominent figures like Stephen Hawking are going to pass judgment on that history and say things like “Philosophy is dead.”

There is a common assumption that science is not a world-view but simply “the way things are.” Along with that assumption goes another: that science derives its authority from its privileged access to how things are—that it launches off from the bedrock of the Real. The odd thing here is that science itself tells us that it does not have a privileged access to

things as they are, and that the philosophical paradoxes in its discoveries, especially in physics, are an open acknowledgment of its many uncertainties.

What we have now is this very uncomfortable joining of an ideological assumption that science is fact-based with the actual work of science, something that is highly speculative and whose reality is often only mathematical. For example, physics is deeply dependent on mathematical modeling, but no one knows why mathematics seems to be so revealing about reality. As the physicists Tony Rothman and George Sudarshan point out in Doubt and Certainty, the math equation of the Black-Scholes model used by stock traders is identical to the equation that shows how a particle moves through a liquid or gas. But, as they observe laconically, in the real world there is a difference between stocks and particle movement.

Even something as familiar as Newtonian equations are mathematical idealizations and, as Einstein showed, they are inadequate in important ways. And if Newtonian predictions about the movements of things as large as astral bodies are idealizations, what can be said about quanta or strings or the branes strings are said to attach to? These things are only numbers. They have no empirical presence at all.

Most Buddhists would have little argument with the statement in The Science Delusion that “the world is something we both find and invent.” How is this understanding at odds with scientism? Even now, after Heisenberg, after quantum physics, so much of the discourse of science in its public proclamations is focused on the establishment of knowledge as fact. This overlooks the paradoxical nature of scientific confirmation. Does confirmation mean positive knowledge of reality? Does it mean probability? Does it mean that something is useful? Newton’s equations have never stopped being useful, even though they have been superseded by general relativity.

Scientism is intolerant of the idea that the universe depends for its being on the participation of mind. Immanuel Kant’s Copernican Revolution was about this single fact: we have no simple access to the thing in itself. Any knowledge we have of reality is necessarily mediated by our own symbolic structures, whether they be math, philosophy, religion, or art. Even the theoretical physicist John Archibald Wheeler could say with conviction, “The universe does not exist ‘out there,’ independent of us. We are inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears to be happening.” Yet what we most often hear from scientism is “We scientists deal in knowledge of truth, and philosophers, artists, and religious believers don’t.” End of conversation.

Many assume that logic and reason lead away from religion. How can the systematic study of literature and art affirm religion? Our culture widely assumes that all reason is empirical reason: a logical development proceeding from an empirical fact. Similarly, we tend to assume that spirit concerns things that are supernatural. But this is not the only way to understand reason or spirit. The essence of the spiritual logic of Buddhism is contained in the four noble truths. There is suffering. Most of this suffering comes from self-interested desire enabled by delusion. This suffering can be stopped. The eightfold path shows how suffering can cease. This is not an appeal to the supernatural, but it is most certainly an appeal to spirit.

The ultimate religious question, the ultimate religious mystery, is not whether or not there is a God. I call myself an atheist because I think that question is silly, childish, and beside the point. The ultimate religious question is “What is compassion?” Or as Christianity puts it, “What is love?” Compassion is not a quality that can be demonstrated empirically. It is not a thing. It is

something that we use flexibly. It speaks to a quality that we keep very close to us: the urgency of kindness. Compassion exists only to the extent that we invest it with the energy of our own lives—“altruism gene” be damned.

This sort of “theo-logic” also exists in the West. If there is a God principle in existential Christianity, it is in its confidence in the ultimacy of compassion. The Protestant theologian Paul Tillich argued that God is the object of our “ultimate concern.” When we are claimed by those concerns, we open ourselves to our true nature.

And art since Romanticism participates in a similar logic. Of course, the common assumption is that art is just imagination or entertainment or a waste of time. My point is that art thinks, and the history of art for the last two centuries shows that art thinks in very particular ways. Art has its own spiritual logic. It asks: How are we to transcend what Friedrich Schiller calls “the misery of culture,” meaning industrial culture in which man is “nothing but a fragment”? For Schiller and the Romantics, the multifold path of art is the way to accomplish the transcendence of this suffering. As Pablo Picasso wrote, “Painting is not made to decorate apartments. It is a weapon of offensive and defensive war against the enemy.” As Picasso’s Guernica or Goya’s The Third of May 1808 show, the “enemy” is cruelty.

Now, in any of these contexts, this is a perverse logic. If you had to judge the situation empirically, I don’t see how you could fail to conclude that the “preponderance of evidence,” as lawyers like to say, points to the idea that, as O’Brien says in Orwell’s 1984, the future is “a boot stamping on a human face—forever.” But Buddhism comes to the opposite conclusion. Our suffering is proof not of who we are—violent because of “human nature”—but of the fact that we are deluded, that we don’t know ourselves, and that if we are to end suffering we must, as Nietzsche says, become who we really are. It is the perversity of this logic that makes it spiritual because it is in no way supported by the facts on the ground. It’s like the story of the Jew who tells his Christian neighbor that he is going to Rome to see what Christianity is really like. The neighbor, of course, fears that once the man sees all of the corruption there he will not convert. But when his neighbor returns, he says, “Ah, my friend, yours is truly the greatest faith, otherwise it could not survive such cruelty and hypocrisy.”

The crucial thing to see in this process of thought is that it is a form of spiritual reason based in realism: our experience of how it is with the human world. True, it is not empirical reason driven by a notionally objective world, but neither are its conclusions dependent on supernaturalism or magical thinking. The idea that all human reason must be empirical is a story that is told to us by our masters.

When critics speak of scientism as an ideology, many seem to be thinking of an ideology as a set of beliefs—like propositions you hold in your head. Your book gave me a sense that ideology, in particular scientism, is much more deeply rooted than that. I use the word ideology in the sense that Marx used it: the stories and ideas that we live out as members of a particular culture. Needless to say, there is a neutral sense in which every culture must have ideologies. The pejorative sense of the term comes from the idea that structures of power and privilege can and do manipulate and enforce these stories in order to support their own interests. The stories stop being concerned with the question “what is the best way for us to live together?” and start being about “what stories best support our own interests?” Telling stories that you want everyone to see themselves in, but that really favor only one group, requires

dishonesty. So what I am concerned with is identifying those dishonest or false elements within the ideology delivered to us by science and its patrons.

Of course, the primary ideological story told by science is that it has no relation to ideology. But that’s what every ideology says. It says, “We are only concerned with the way things really are.” And so the science of economics tells us that self-interest is rational, that it is the essence of freedom, and that it may even be a part of our genetic makeup. These become the covering fictions for stupendous destruction and cruelty. As Buddhism argues, these ideas are not skillful. They are delusions, and they do great harm.

Neuroscience’s claim to be able to understand meditation in terms of the mechanics of neurons and chemicals is another example of ideological storytelling. You can have Buddhism, this story goes, as long as you are willing to acknowledge that it can be best understood through neuroscience. Buddhism is dangerous if it can’t be made to confirm our culture’s empiricist assumptions. If Buddhism refuses to confirm those assumptions, it is a counterculture and therefore a threat to the stability of the status quo. My feeling is that if we in the West are fated to misperceive Asian Buddhism, let it be a creative misperception in the spirit of Buddhism, and not merely the repetition of a familiar and oppressive ideology.

You’ve written that we don’t only have technology, we also have technocracy—which is run by corporatists, militarists, and self-serving politicians. You see a moral urgency to this situation, where many, including many Buddhists, are much more sanguine. It is a mistake to think that we just happen to have these toys and gadgets around without trying to understand what their relationship is to the larger culture. One of the first books that spoke to me powerfully as political theory was Theodore Roszak’s The Making of a Counter Culture (1968). I reread it recently, and it still holds up very well. He wrote, “By technocracy, I mean that social form in which an industrial society reaches the peak of its organizational integration.” Theodor Adorno called it “administered society.” An administered society is one in which technological rationality and industrial organization have penetrated deeply into every aspect of how we live.

For example, by bringing personal computers into our homes, we also brought our workstations into our homes. And so, who knows how many hours a week you work? In a sense, many workers are never not at work, because now they carry their job in their pocket. Or consider service workers in the fast food industry. These workers are treated not as humans but as a part of a superefficient machine, and the skills required of them are crudely mechanical as well.

The more normalized all of this becomes, the more oppressive—and, needless to say, perversely successful—it is. The result is a culture that is “totalized.” Every aspect of the culture is made conformable to a certain technocratic and mechanistic ideal. That’s why I say that scientism is such an important part of state ideology. It is doing work for the boss.

How? Simply by normalizing the idea that everything is a machine, especially us. We are not likely to make a Thoreauvian or a Buddhist critique of technocracy if we have been convinced that we are computers. Thoreauvian critiques are disruptive and disobedient, and technocracy would prefer that we not think in that way. Ultimately, we are arguing about what it means to be human.

For the moment, the idea that we are neural computers is in ascendancy. Currently, from a very early age our children are given to understand that if they want a decent standard of living, they’re going to have to make their peace (ideally, an enthusiastic peace) with Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math, or STEM. Universities are now in the business of training people to go out into a world that is understood to be one vast mechanism, and this includes nature or, as we now say, “the ecosystem.” But that’s okay because we’re computers too. I can’t emphasize enough how oppressive this feels to many young people. As one reviewer of my book wrote, rather bitterly, “Anyone who doesn’t want to be a graphic designer, or a techie, or a slavish Apple devotee—no jobs for you!” And, I’ll add, no way to pay off your huge student loans.

Anyone who doubts the seriousness of this vision should read David Brooks’s December 2013 column for The New York Times “Thinking for the Future,” in which he predicts that the economy of the future will depend upon “mechanized intelligence.” Fifteen percent of the working population will make up a mandarin class of computer geeks and the “bottom 85%” will serve them as “greeters” or by doing things like running food trucks. And yet, Brooks claims, this vast class of servants will have “rich lives” that will be provided for them by the “free bounty of the Internet.”

In your own Thoreauvian article “The Spirit of Disobedience: An Invitation to Resistance,” you quoted Simone Weil: “The authentic and pure values—truth, beauty, and goodness—in the activity of a human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the full attention to the object.” In light of this perspective, what are your thoughts about the introduction of meditation into education and industry, especially into the “creative industries” of Silicon Valley? Thoreau and Weil were writers coming out of the Romantic tradition. For me, the Romantic movement was an attempt to create a wisdom literature for the West. A good part of that wisdom had to do with returning us to the immediacy of the world. As a poetic technique this has come to be known as “defamiliarization.” What it attempts to do is to destroy the world of custom, habit, stereotype, and ideology so that we can see things for what they are, so that we can see and feel the “stone’s stoniness.” When Walt Whitman says that his poetry is about “leaves of grass,” he is essentially saying, We have not been attentive. We need to look again at this leaf of grass. He wrote, “Bring all the art and science of the world, and baffle and humble it with one spear of grass.”

Perhaps the saddest thing we can say about our culture is that it is a culture of distraction. “Attention deficit” is a cultural disorder, a debasement of spirit, before it is an ailment in our children to be treated with Ritalin.

As for Silicon Valley, it has a legitimate interest in the health of its workers, but it has little interest in Weil’s notion of “the authentic and pure values.” Its primary aim is to bring Buddhist meditation techniques (as neuroscience understands them) to the aid of corporate culture, such as in the Search Inside Yourself program developed at Google. This is from the Search Inside Yourself Leadership Institute website:

Developed at Google and based on the latest in neuroscience research, our programs offer attention and mindfulness training that build the core emotional intelligence skills needed for peak performance and effective leadership. We help professionals at all levels adapt, management teams evolve, and leaders optimize their impact and influence.

Mindfulness is enabling corporations to “optimize impact”? In this view of things, mindfulness can be extracted from a context of Buddhist meanings, values, and purposes. Meditation and mindfulness are not part of a whole way of life but only a spiritual technology, a mental app that is the same regardless of how it is used and what it is used for. It is as if we were trying to create a Buddhism based on the careful maintenance of a delusion, a science delusion. It reminds me of the Babylonian captivity in the Hebrew Bible, but now the question for Buddhists is whether or not we can exist in technological exile and still remain a “faithful remnant.”

Bringing Buddhist meditation techniques into industry accomplishes two things for industry. It does actually give companies like Google something useful for an employee’s well-being, but it also neutralizes a potentially disruptive adversary. Buddhism has its own orienting perspectives, attitudes, and values, as does American corporate culture. And not only are they very different from each other, they are also often fundamentally opposed to each other.

A benign way to think about this is that once people experience the benefits of mindfulness they will become interested in the dharma and develop a truer appreciation for Buddhism—and that would be fine. But the problem is that neither Buddhists nor employees are in control of how this will play out. Industry is in control. This is how ideology works. It takes something that has the capacity to be oppositional, like Buddhism, and it redefines it. And somewhere down the line, we forget that it ever had its own meaning.

It’s not that any one active ideology accomplishes all that needs to be done; rather, it is the constant repetition of certain themes and ideas that tend to construct a kind of “nature.” Ideology functions by saying “this is nature”—this is the way things are; this is the way the world is. So, Obama talks about STEM, scientists talk about the human computer, universities talk about “workforce preparation,” and industry talks about the benefits of the neuroscience of meditation, but it all becomes something that feels like a consistent world, and after a while we lose the ability to look at it skeptically. At that point we no longer bother to ask to be treated humanly. At that point we accept our fate as mere functions. Ideology’s job is to make people believe that their prison is a pleasure dome.

Linda Heuman is a Tricycle contributing editor. Tricycle Spring 2014

April 9, 2014 Nationalism

The Case for Nationalism

Click here for a pdf version
By John O’Sullivan    March 21, 2014
(Trying to abolish or replace the nation-state is almost certain to produce more evils than it deters. )

Incessant “antifascist” propaganda from Moscow, baseless claims of attacks against Russians in Ukraine, incitement of Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine, Russian troops without insignia seizing official buildings in Crimea, a stage-managed illegal plebiscite there and then its annexation by Russia, assurances from President Vladimir Putin that he has no further territorial designs in Europe (though, alas, he may be forced to intervene elsewhere to protect ethnic Russians)—yes, it all has the disturbing ring of the 1930s.

Isn’t this where nationalism leads—to fascism and war?

That is a common interpretation of Europe’s recent crises. It is also, coincidentally, Mr. Putin’s interpretation of events in Ukraine, which he blames on neo-fascist followers of the nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, who was murdered by the KGB in 1959. But this view is really too simple by half.

Nationalists are certainly implicated in the Ukraine crisis, but more as victims than perpetrators. The crisis began as an attempt by Moscow to rescue its stillborn concept of a Eurasian Economic Union by forcing Ukraine to join it and to reject associate membership in the European Union.

Mr. Putin, who isn’t a nationalist (see below) but the ruler of a shaky multinational empire hostile to nationalism, sparked off the crisis by closing Russia’s borders to Ukraine’s agricultural exports. He did so to compel a reluctant President Viktor Yanukovych to abandon the more popular EU option.

The Ukrainian government, encouraged by Mr. Putin, unified the assorted democrats, nationalists and activists of the left and the right who protested this move by firing indiscriminately on them. Mr. Yanukovych’s power crumbled almost visibly; he fled; and a new Ukrainian government that includes nationalists took over.

Nationalism was thus one impulse in this general movement. Others were love of freedom, desire for a more democratic system, economic hopes for greater prosperity through ties to Western Europe and simple human decency. The Ukrainians inspired by these aims have just sustained an (inevitable) defeat in Crimea, but they still govern most of Ukraine, which is now escaping from Moscow’s post-Soviet institutions. While that remains the case, Mr. Putin has suffered a reverse overall.

If Ukrainian nationalists have been reactive, even victimized, in this crisis, what about Mr. Putin himself? His actions have certainly been objectionable—ruthless, aggressive, deceitful, illegal, repressive, subversive. But to describe them as “nationalist” is to reduce the concept of nationalism to a politics of aggressive self-assertion. There is no reason to suppose that nations and nation-states are more prone to indulge in such folly than are federations, empires or states founded on nonnational principles.

Mr. Putin has indeed acted ruthlessly of late, but he has done so in the service of what he sees as clear state or even personal interests, not from a commitment to Russian peoplehood.

The history of the 1930s is instructive for making the necessary distinctions here. World War II began as the result of a conspiracy by Hitler and Stalin—the Nazi-Soviet Pact—to invade Poland and divide Eastern Europe and the Baltic states between them. Nazi Germany was a state built upon the ideology of racial nationalism (which places race above nationhood), the Soviet Union upon the ideology of proletarian internationalism (which rejects nationalism entirely). Both acted far more brutally and unrestrainedly than any conventional nation-state of the period.

Besides, today’s Russian Federation is itself not a nation-state but an empire. Mr. Putin’s conduct of the crisis, in addition to being aggressive, might best be described as imperialist or neo-imperialist, not nationalist. We should not illegitimately associate the nation-state with crimes that aren’t uniquely nationalist and may even be less likely to be committed by stable nation-states.

This matters because nationalism is an increasingly necessary word that is too often misused as a term of abuse. Nationalisms and nationalist movements are popping up all over Europe. These can take very different forms: left, right and ambivalent. Some are straightforward secessionist movements, like the nationalist parties in Scotland and Catalonia, striving to establish new states rooted in historic nations. Others are movements resisting further integration of their existing nation-states into the European Community, such as the True Finns party in Finland and the U.K. Independence Party in Britain.

Still others want to protect the nation and its distinctive political spirit (the National Front in France), or the welfare state (the Danish People’s Party in Denmark) or “liberal values” (the Party of Freedom led by Geert Wilders in Holland) that each feels is threatened by mass immigration. Even the mercifully cautious Germans have the Alternative for Germany party, which, though not avowedly nationalist, emits a distinctively postwar German anti-Euro economic nationalism—and should probably be renamed the Alliance of Patriotic Bankers.

Most of these parties, which didn’t exist 20 years ago, are now represented in Europe’s parliaments. They are expected to do well in May’s elections. They probably won’t win power or enter government, but they force mainstream parties to deal with such issues as the loss of national sovereignty.

In the eyes of Europe’s various political and cultural establishments—what the British call the Great and the Good—none of this should be happening. It is akin to water running uphill. For several decades now, we have heard from these precincts that the nation-state is on its way out, losing power upward to supranational institutions and downward to organized minority groups. Behind their hands, the critics of resurgent nationalism murmur that it is nothing but xenophobia, authoritarianism or even fascism, in folkloric drag. They see Europe’s rising nationalist parties as the preserve of bitter losers or those in the grip of nostalgia.

Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, expressed this view perfectly in 2010 when he announced for the umpteenth time that the nation-state was dead, adding: “The biggest enemy of Europe today is fear; fear leads to egoism, egoism leads to nationalism, and nationalism leads to war.”

This pronouncement didn’t foresee Mr. Putin’s recent actions. But it illustrates nicely how Europe’s political elites see events like the Ukraine crisis in the distorting mirror of anti-nationalism. This view persuades them to consider nationalism a threat, but a dying one. And it is, quite simply, wrong on both counts.

A practical refutation of this view lies in the fact that there are more nation-states in the world today than ever before. They have multiplied since 1945 in two great leaps forward: the decolonization period of the 1950s and 1960s, and the years following the dissolution of communism in 1989 and 1991. Some of these nations gained their independence, alas, by war and revolution—Zimbabwe, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo. Others did so by peaceful negotiation. Most former British colonies and Soviet republics took this route, but the most significant example of it is the “velvet divorce” that produced successful Czech and Slovak states.

This upsurge of nationhood might be dismissed as a detour on the high road to global governance if the establishment view of nationalism weren’t so absurdly crude. It elides vital distinctions and treats all forms of national loyalty as if they were the most aggressive and exclusivist type. In reality, the full spectrum of nationalist loyalties runs roughly as follows: from Nazism, which is totalitarian racial nationalism; to fascism, which is authoritarian and aggressive nationalism; to ethnic nationalism, which is exclusivist, treating ethnic minorities as second-class citizens (if that); to civic nationalism, which opens full citizenship to all born in the national territory in return for their loyalty to the nation and its institutions; and finally, to patriotism, which is that same national loyalty plus simple love of country—its scenery, its sights and sounds, its characteristic architecture, its songs and poems, its people, its wonderful familiarity.

Here, for instance, is George Orwell, perhaps the most famous critic of nationalism, upon returning to southern England from Spain: “Down here it was still the England I had known in my childhood: the railway-cuttings smothered in wildflowers, the deep meadows where the great shining horses browse and meditate, the slow-moving streams bordered by willows, the green bosoms of the elms, the larkspurs in the cottage gardens; and then the huge peaceful wilderness of outer London, the barges on the miry river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket matches and Royal weddings, the men in bowler hats, the pigeons in Trafalgar Square, the red buses, the blue policemen—all sleeping the deep, deep sleep of England.”

England has changed since then, of course; men no longer wear bowler hats. But it would be as absurd to condemn such a tender patriotism as likely to lead to fascism as it would be to abstain from all interest in sex on the grounds that it might lead to promiscuity. Ordinary people, attached to reality as they must be to survive, feel exactly that sense of absurdity when they hear statements like Mr. Van Rompuy’s.

But that hasn’t hitherto affected their political behavior. Why have they suddenly begun thinking and voting in line with such sentiments?

One obvious reason is that all the ideological rivals to patriotism have been largely discredited. Orwell pointed out that those who abandoned patriotism generally adopted a more virulent ideological substitute. In our day, the most obvious rival ideologies are Europeanism in Europe and multiculturalism in the U.S., both of which seek to weaken national patriotism to change the political character of their societies.

Scots who hope to break away from the U.K. rally in Edinburgh in September 2013, a year before a scheduled referendum on independence for Scotland. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

But neither of these creeds has yet become more than a niche loyalty, even though they enjoy lavish official support and the sympathy of those government officials, international bureaucrats, NGO executives, “denationalized” corporate managers and academics ambitious to be the vanguard of the new or transformed nation. Old-fashioned patriotism survives, perhaps weakened by such defections, but not seriously challenged. It remains in the shadows until tempted into the open by a 9/11, or an anniversary of D-Day or the funeral of a Margaret Thatcher. It is then suddenly recognized as the sentiment of most of the nation.

Until recently, those voters for whom patriotism and the national interest were determining issues found comfortable homes in parties of both the left and the right. But that has gradually ceased to be true.

As parties of the left swapped their working-class identity for that of middle-class liberalism, they began to think patriotism vulgar, cheap and xenophobic. At the same time, mainstream parties of the right drifted unthinkingly into a posture that treated nationalist and socially conservative voters as somewhat embarrassing elderly relatives whose views could be safely ignored. Party leaders reasoned that their atavistic voters had nowhere else to go.

The result can be seen most dramatically in Britain, where the U.K. Independence Party, having secured its base among traditional middle-class Tories, is now harvesting new votes from patriotic blue-collar Laborites. But one can see similar outcomes throughout Europe.

Another factor in this resurgence is a change of intellectual fashion toward bigness. Fewer people in all classes are still confident that the future belongs to the big battalions. They have noticed that smaller states are likely to be richer, easier to manage and closer to the people than larger states. As the Economist magazine pointed out a few years ago: “Of the 10 countries with populations of over 100 [million], only the U.S. and Japan are prosperous.”

These economic facts remove an important obstacle to secession. And if there ever was a link between prosperity and bigness, it has been dissolved by free trade and globalization, which ensure that the size of a nation need no longer coincide with the size of the market open to it. At the same time, a government can shrink to the size that its citizens find most convenient to control.

The U.S. is the exception to these rules—it is both large and prosperous—because its federalism distributes power to states and localities, where it can be better controlled. Switzerland is another example. Europe might imitate America’s success if it were to model itself on Switzerland and distribute power downward. But the opposite is happening—in both Europe and America.

A final brief argument is perhaps the strongest: Nation-states are an almost necessary basis for democracy. A common language and culture, a common allegiance to national institutions, a common sense of destiny, all within a defined territory, with equal rights for all citizens—these seem to be the conditions that enable people with different opinions and interests to accept political defeat and the passage of laws to which they strongly object. There are a few exceptions to this rule—India, Switzerland—but many more confirmations of it.

None of these many considerations justify supporting nationalism as a universal principle of statehood. There is no such principle. States rooted in ideas as different as popular consent and the dynastic principle have been handed down to us by history. Wholesale reconstruction of them is utopian and nearly always fails. The best we can hope for is to improve them by piecemeal reform along the grain of their history.

But trying to abolish or replace the nation-state is almost certain to produce more evils than it deters. The lesson of recent history is that nationalism is here to stay—and that secure, stable and satisfied nation-states are likely to want friendship with neighboring countries rather than their conquest. Wise political leaders anxious for peace will concentrate on shaping their people’s nationalism into an amiable patriotism rather than on submerging it in a new sovereignty and driving it toward its darker manifestations.

Mr. O’Sullivan is director of the Danube Institute in Budapest and a senior fellow of the National Review Institute in New York.
— —
Jason C. Taylor   Fayetteville, N.C.
John O’Sullivan’s positive case for nationalism rooted in patriotism flies in the face of conventional wisdom and a powerful trend toward global governance in the West, but it was wonderful to read his heretical challenge to internationalist orthodoxy (“The Case for Nationalism,” Review, March 22). Academics interested in transforming nations tend to gloss over the fact that aggressor countries in World War II—Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan—were the nations with the biggest, most powerful central governments. Their messianic missions, driven by racial purity or collectivist ideology, were possible only with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes unchecked by voters and democratic institutions.

As patriotism has become the domain of narrow-minded, right-wing extremists in the U.S. (according to leftist elites), we may forget that the overwhelming desire of most “extremist” patriots is to shrink our federal government and return power to state and local governments and individuals. There is a distinct (and potentially dangerous) isolationist streak in the conservative movement that wants a stronger national defense, but only for defense, not for intervention in world affairs. But the underlying logic of the conservative isolationist streak is peace through strength.

If most of the world’s bloodiest confrontations in the past century are attributable to very powerful, non- or faux-democratic central governments, why in the world does it make sense to elevate and consolidate governance in global bodies that have little or no accountability to an electorate? The leftist goal to extinguish nation-state loyalties in favor of a commitment to an international ruling body of elites is mind-bogglingly naive. As Mr. O’Sullivan eloquently explains, nationalism is a unifying and positive sentiment in societies that cannot or do not let their government bureaucracies grow too big.

David Gallup
President and  General Counsel , World Service Authority , Washington
The case for nationalism dependent on “secure, stable and satisfied nation states” and “wise political leaders” is flawed. More than 70% of the world’s population lives in nations that aren’t stable or whose political leaders don’t respect human rights.

World law reaffirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a framework for global peace that is not dependent on allegiance to nation-states. Without a global legal framework, “amiable patriotism” cannot prevent nations’ “darker manifestations.”

Ronald J. Glossop   St. Louis
Mr. O’Sullivan seems not to understand that federations can be a way of preserving nations and nation-states while maintaining peace by subordinating them to a higher centralized authority. He seems to think that one must choose between having small, good nation-states and large, bad ones. He regards the U.S. and India as exceptional rather than as large federations that could act as guides for the future.

The continuing integration of the peoples of planet Earth will eventually lead to a democratic world federation that ends global anarchy while preserving nation-states and internal autonomous provinces as subordinate entities. It will produce world peace and a readiness to deal seriously with global problems, something thwarted now by unlimited national sovereignty. Loyalty to the nation and to the nation-state won’t be eliminated, but it will be subordinated to loyalty to humanity, “humatriotism.”

Basil Coukis :
As of right now, tail-chasing circumlocution in the article has inspired more than a hundred impassioned comments, many of them quoting Wikipedia and other high authorities. No need for scholarship. Human nature is not complicated.

The human condition is one of war of everyone against everyone else. Since the many always overwhelm the few, an individual is advised to seek out other individuals and form a temporary alliance with them. The alliance can then fight everyone who is not part of the alliance.

Alliances are formed by those who share the belief that if someone has to die, it is preferable that this be our neighbor. To ensure that we all understand this requires that we can talk among ourselves. Hence, the first condition for any effective alliance is a common language.

The second condition is to justify why our neighbors must die so that we live. Realizing that our alliance contains sensitive souls who abhor armed conflict, we resort to arguments attractive to sensitive souls. Which is to say, metaphysical ones. We loudly proclaim that we deplore violence, that the mere thought of war is repulsive to us, that we shall never wage war unless we are forced into it, that if we are forced into it we shall prevail because we are not fighting to oppress but to bring peace on earth and goodwill to all living creatures. In fact, we fight this war to end all war. More specifically, we fight this war to make the world safe for democracy. Obviously, the uses of metaphysics in the fabrication of alliances are considerable.

But one problem lurks. Size of the alliance. The bigger the alliance, the greater the temptation to enlarge it further. Soon enough, it may contain groups which do not speak the same language and do not subscribe to the beliefs and superstitions of the founding members. Past a certain size, all alliances become impotent and fall apart. In short, viable alliances must be ethnically, linguistically and doctrinally homogeneous.

NATO is not.  Russia is.

ROBERT WOLFF:
“The Gun Is Civilizing”  By Maj. L. Caudill USMC (Ret)

“Human beings only have two ways to deal with one another: reason and force . If you want me to do something for you, you have a choice of either convincing me via argument, or force me to do your bidding under threat of force. Every human interaction falls into one of those two categories, without exception. Reason or force, that’s it.

“In a truly desirable, moral and civilized society, people mainly interact through persuasion . Force has no place as a valid method of social interaction, and a thing that removes force from the menu is the personal firearm, as paradoxical as it may sound to some.

“When I carry a gun, you cannot deal with me by force. You have to use reason and try to persuade me, because I have a way to negate your threat or employment of force .

“The gun is the only personal weapon that puts a 100-pound woman on equal footing with a 220-pound mugger, a 75-year old retiree on equal footing with a 19-year old gang banger, and a single guy on equal footing with a carload of drunk guys with baseball bats. The gun removes the disparity in physical strength, size, or numbers between a potential attacker and a defender.

“There are plenty of people who consider the gun as the source of bad force equations. These are the people who think that we’d be more civilized if all guns were removed from society, because a firearm makes it easier for a [armed] mugger to do his job. That, of course, is only true if the mugger’s potential victims are mostly disarmed either by choice or by legislative fiat – it has no validity when most of a mugger’s potential marks are armed.

“People who argue for the banning of arms ask for automatic rule by the young, the strong, and the many, and that’s the exact opposite of a civilized society. A mugger, even an armed one, can only make a successful living in a society where the state has granted him a force monopoly .

“Then there’s the argument that the gun makes confrontations lethal that otherwise would only result in injury. This argument is fallacious in several ways. Without guns involved, confrontations are won by the physically superior party inflicting overwhelming injury on the loser.

“People who think that fists, bats, sticks, or stones don’t constitute lethal force, watch too much TV, where people take beatings and come out of it with a bloody lip at worst. The fact that the gun makes lethal force easier, works solely in favor of the weaker defender, not the stronger attacker. If both are armed, the field is level.

“The gun is the only weapon that’s as lethal in the hands of an octogenarian as it is in the hands of a weight lifter. It simply would not work as well as a force equalizer if it wasn’t both lethal and easily employable. Our social structure can help by finding effective ways to prevent ownership or ownership privileges (concealment, etc) by felons (untrustworthy) or mentally disturbed (incapable) individuals to the best of its ability.

“When I carry a gun, I don’t do so because I am looking for a fight, but because I’m looking to be left alone. The gun at my side means that I cannot be forced, only persuaded. I don’t carry it because I’m afraid, but because it enables me to be unafraid. It doesn’t limit the actions of those who would interact with me through reason, only the actions of those who would do so by force. It removes force from the equation… which is why carrying a gun is a civilized act. ”

The problem is that loss of ethical protocols and the “amoral revolution” put the solutions into the realm of force since institutions no longer recognize Balance of Power as a desirable status quo. When is all about winning in an environment where there are no constraints on the means of competition then the only other choice is force – and an arms race at all levels of society.

Peter Borregard Replied:
Sigh. The fictional Maj. Caudill again.
This was written by author and blogger Marko Kloos. As much as I enjoy his writing, he is setting up a false dichotomy. It isn’t force or reason. It’s force or persuasion. Maybe by reason, maybe not.

Emmanuel Goldstein Wrote:
.>> Nation-states are an almost necessary basis for democracy. A common language and culture, a common allegiance to national institutions, a common sense of destiny, all within a defined territory, with equal rights for all citizens—these seem to be the conditions that enable people with different opinions and interests to accept political defeat and the passage of laws to which they strongly object. <<
Borders – Language – Culture
It doesn’t get much simpler than that.

ROBERT WOLFF Replied:
James,

You are missing Capitalism, which is also an internationalist system, based on world rule by capitalist institutions. The despotism of the international banks that control world governments can be compared to the despotism of allied world governments under Communism that control world financial institutions.

The issue is, “Which institution controls the other?” See http://www.amazon.com/The-End-Free-Market-Corporations/dp/B008D6SC9O – “The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?”

The ideal of Balance of Power, among institutions that provides checks and balances on the despotism of one institution over others whether it be a private or public institutions, means all institutions require the power not to seek monopolistic power but to maintain ethical relations with other institutions that have become despotic.

In the current case of Russian switch in their economic architecture to a political institution in control of banking institutions within their area of responsibility, versus allowing the despotism of the Western banking system to determine Russia’s future is really nothing more than Russia checking the power of the Western banking establishment (New World Order, supported by NATO) that has proven to be a poor partner to Russia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Russia actually has no choice but to establish an alternative Eurasian Economic Union backed by a unified military force of those member nations to combat the despotism of the NWO/NATO that refuses to admit Russia.

Nationalism is the counterforce to despotism by an internationalist institution that is destroying national governments and national economic societies worldwide. Thus nationalism can be a force for “Balance of Power” among institutions worldwide. Having read a number Putin’s writings, that is clearly his current philosophy.

Frank Pecarich Wrote:
The author says, “A common language and culture, a common allegiance to national institutions, a common sense of destiny, all within a defined territory, with equal rights for all citizens—these seem to be the conditions that enable people with different opinions and interests to accept political defeat and the passage of laws to which they strongly object.”

Compromise is only possible among competing interests when they can agree on an overarching goal. That has been impossible in the US. Citizens are deeply divided about who should get the benefits of government and under what conditions. This problem has been made extraordinarily difficult by the cultural diversity in the country. Many public policy analysts see no fix to that.

Dr. Byron Roth in his 2010 book “The Perils of Diversity: Immigration and Human Nature” argues that the debate over immigration policy in the Western world is critically uninformed by the sciences of evolutionary biology and psychology. In his work he examines the intersection between culture, genetics, IQ and society. Prominent among the fundamental features of human nature is a natural bias toward one’s own kind, making harmony in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural societies problematic at best. He says , “All historical evidence indicates that “diversity” is not a strength, and that blood is thicker than water. Ignoring such biological realities leads to failed social experiments that may cause great human suffering.”

Roth points out that “multiculturism denies historical and scientific evidence that people differ in important biological and cultural ways that makes their assimilation into host countries problematic. Frank Salter presents a powerful case for the adaptiveness of ethnocentrism. Different human ethnic groups and races have been separated for thousands of years, and during this period they have evolved some genetic distinctiveness. This genetic distinctiveness constitutes a storehouse of genetic interest

March 26, 2014 Reinventing Ethics

Reinventing Ethics

By HOWARD GARDNER   Click here for a pdf version

What’s good and what’s bad? There are plenty of reasons to believe that human nature changes slowly, if at all — all’s still fair in love and war. For millennia, religious believers have attributed our nature to God’s image, as well as to God’s plan. In recent years, evolutionary psychologists peered directly at our forerunners on the savannahs of East Africa; if human beings change, we do so gradually over thousands of years. Given little or nothing new in the human firmament, traditional morality — the “goods” and “bads” as outlined in the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule — should suffice.

My view of the matter is quite different. As I see it, human beings and citizens in complex, modern democratic societies regularly confront situations in which traditional morality provides little if any guidance. Moreover, tenable views of “good” and “bad” that arose in the last few centuries are being radically challenged, most notably by the societal shifts spurred by digital media. If we are to have actions and solutions adequate to our era, we will need to create and experiment with fresh approaches to identifying the right course of action.

Let’s start with the Ten Commandments. We are enjoined to honor our parents, and to avoid murder, theft, adultery and dishonesty. Or consider the Golden Rule: “Do onto others. “ A moment’s reflection reveals that these commandments concern how we treat those nearby — we might say those 150 persons who, according to anthropologist Robin Dunbar, each of us has evolved to be able to know well. For most of history, and all of pre-history, our morality has been extended to our geographical neighbors — anyone else falls outside the framework of neighborly morality.

This characterization is largely true until we reach the modern era — the last few centuries, particularly in the West. The one dramatic exception is the brief period of the Greek city-state. Citizens of Athens pledged to work for the improvement and glory of the entire society. And in extending the gamut of responsibility, the Hippocratic oath of the Periclean era enjoined physicians to extend aid and avoid mistreatment of any person in need of medical attention. As explained a century ago by the German sociologist Max Weber, professionals were no longer simply humans relating to their neighbors. Rather, the doctor, the lawyer, the architect, the educator had taken on more specified and finely articulated roles, with characteristic rights and responsibilities. Now, the morality that we direct to those living in the neighborhood and the ethics that a responsible professional should direct to all who come within his or her ambit, whether friend, foe, or someone from outside one’s customary circle, are two quite different matters.

It would be hyperbolic to maintain that “the ethics of roles” disappeared for almost two millennia. Yet this wider sense of responsibility was much less evident after classical times, when almost everyone was a peasant, guilds kept their practices secret and emerging states were hierarchical and authoritarian. Only as these trends were gradually overturned in the West in the last few centuries, did the role of the responsible professional re-emerge. The rise of the Fabians

in England, of the progressives in the United States or of the elite professional classes in Bismarckian and Weimar Germany, to take some familiar examples, established a cohort of individuals who were given status and a comfortable livelihood in return for the license to render complex judgments and decisions in a disinterested manner. According to the historian Kenneth Lynn, writing in the early 1960s, “Everywhere in American life, the professions are triumphant.”

But even as Lynn wrote, the hegemony of the professions was breaking down. It was not only the witty George Bernard Shaw who believed that “professions are a conspiracy against the laity.” Many saw the professions as the province of the privileged — chiefly white, primarily Anglo- Saxon in lineage, largely male. Most of us today deem the democratization — or demoticization — of the professions as a healthy development. Yet, I maintain that this trend had its costs. Specifically, the very notion of professions serving the wider community has broken down, to be replaced by a growing consensus that professions are by their nature destined to serve parochial interests.

When Anthony Kronman, a professor and former dean of Yale School of Law, wrote nostalgically in 1995 about “the lost lawyer,” he has in mind the “found lawyer” who is no longer concerned with the health of the community but only with the wealth of his employers, generally large corporations. And the same waning of disinterestedness can be seen in the once- solo practitioner physician (“Marcus Welby”) who is now “managed” by the business school graduates of the health maintenance organization; the once “Mr. Smith goes to Washington” politician now under the thumbs of the most wealthy donors; the once selfless “ Mr. Chips” who serves his own careerist interests rather than those of the discipline, the college or the students.

Why should this matter? If my argument is correct, the professional deals every day with issues that cannot possibly be decided simply by consulting the Bible or some other traditional moral code. At which point should the journalist protect an anonymous source? Should a lawyer continue to defend a client whom she believes to be lying? Ought a medical scientist take research support when the funds come from a convicted felon or when subjects cannot give informed consent? Alas, traditional texts don’t provide reliable answers to these questions — they don’t even raise them. And yet, if professions are to disappear, should we simply answer these vexed questions by flipping a coin or by majority vote?

Perhaps the gradual undermining of the professions was inevitable, but it has certainly been accelerated by the emergence and increasing prevalence of the digital media. At the fingertips of anyone with a digital device, one can now learn the good, the bad, and the ugly of just about any professional practitioner — without the means of determining the legitimacy of these characterizations. Moreover, one can instantly access all forms of real and faux expertise on issues ranging from the treatment of disease to the preparation of term papers to the drawing up of a will or a trust fund. Tomorrow, if not today, one will be able to gain accreditation or diplomas for the thousand-plus careers that now style themselves as “professions.” And shouldn’t we honor these sheepskins, particularly if we cannot reliably distinguish on the basis of a score on a bar exam between those who went for three years to Yale Law School and those who enrolled in Dr. Khan’s free online course in legal thinking and practice?

These forces of democratization and digitalization will not go away. Ethical dilemmas are no longer going to be decided solely by those who wear certain clothing and who have a certain professional pedigree. How then should we go about deciding which of the alternative courses of action is the right one, or at least the one that is more ethical?

My solution involves the recasting of venerable institutions into forms appropriate for the contemporary era. In ancient Greece and Rome, citizens gathered in the central square, or agora, to discuss complex issues. Much the same occurred centuries later in the fabled town hall meetings of New England. A congruent “mentality” characterized the physical “commons” in which members of a community grazed their animals. Unless each member respected the need to limit grazing time, the pasture land would not be arable.

I call on members of a professional community to create common spaces in which they can reflect on ethical conundra of our era. For the first time in human history, it is not essential that participants occupy the same physical space. Virtual common spaces can allow all who have interest and knowledge in the area to weigh in — whether the topic is the protection of sources by journalists, the determination of which intellectual property can legitimately be downloaded and which not, whether studies of the creation of a deadly new strain of virus should be published. Indeed, in the last decade, in professions ranging from journalism and law to medicine and science, such spaces have been created and, in some case, have been ably curated.

Still, by themselves “virtual agoras” are limited; they can be hijacked, trivialized, or ignored. And so I recommend the reinvigoration of the role of “trustees” — individuals afforded the privilege of maintaining the standards of an institution or profession. Traditionally, trustees were drawn from the rank of wise seniors, and such persons can offer both time and experience. But particularly in a fast changing world, trustees should reflect the range of ages and experiences. And so, as an example, young journalists should be asked to choose as trustees both peers and veterans whom they admire; and veteran journalists should nominate both peers and younger colleagues who embody the best of the profession. These trustees should have vested in them a spectrum of powers, ranging from an identification of best practices to the institution of rules governing admission to or expulsion from the profession.

Clearly, in an era marked by fast change, the creation of attractive agoras and of respected trustees will not be easy. Nor will the relation between these spaces and these persons be straightforward. Yet, given the importance of establishing ethical practices in our time, we need starting points, and these appear to be the most promising. I’m fully confident that good trustees and well-curated agoras can improve on my recommendations!

The problem with a belief in the immutability of morality is the same as the problem with a belief that the American Constitution contains the answers to all legal disputes. Like the Ten Commandments (or the code of Hammurabi or the Analects of Confucius), the Constitution is a remarkable document for its time. But it’s absurd to believe that the text magically contains the answers to complex modern issues: the definition of what it means to be alive, or how the commerce clause or the right to bear arms amendment should be interpreted; or whether a corporation is a person. By the same token, while we can draw inspiration from the classical texts and teachings of neighborly morality, we cannot expect that dilemmas of professional life

will be settled by recourse to these sources. But we need not tackle these alone. If we can draw on wise people across the age spectrum, and enable virtual as well as face-to-face discussion, we are most likely to arrive at an ethical landscape adequate for our time.

Howard Gardner is the Hobbs Professor of Cognition and Education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. His most recent book is “Truth, Beauty and Goodness Reframed: Educating for the Virtues in the Age of Truthiness and Twitter.”

Ross Williams Grand Rapids, Minnesota John Richmond

What’s missing here is an appraisal of the effect our economic system has had on traditional ethics and morality. “Doing unto others” does not make for good capitalism, and for me, that’s where the trouble starts. Prof. Gardner touched on this briefly in describing the difference between the “lost” and”found” lawyers, doctors today vs. those of yesteryear, etc. The difference is that we all now work for someone else, or more precisely, something else; the corporation and it’s single-the addition minded focus on ever-expanding profit. Any discussion of what form our morality and ethics should take today must also include the system in which we all earn our living.

An Ordinary American Prague

I disagree with the thesis of this column. The problem is not in our ethical standards, be they the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule. The problem is with our imagination, our failure to identify humans at a distance as “neighbors”. The limits of our empathy are too small for the modern world. Perhaps widespread education purposely aimed to enlarge our identification with “the other” can change that. Or perhaps only the slow, incremental change in human nature can do so. But I am fairly certain that a few “professions” adopting new ethical standards is not going to change it.

Gemli Boston

God help us if we had to rely on the Bible to acquire our sense of morality. Human beings would never have evolved if we had to wait for the Ten Commandments to tell us that it was wrong to lie, steal and murder. We could never have survived as a species if we could not trust each other, or if we were all plotting our neighbor’s demise.

In general, we should be very cautious of the kind of morality that comes from religious sources. The Good Book has good advice concerning how a man should treat his slaves, and how to sell his daughter into sexual slavery, along with instructions on how to lay waste to neighboring villages, kill every man and child, while saving the virgins for, well, later.

There is an innate sense of morality that comes with being a human being. It doesn’t come from a book; it’s part of our standard equipment. It has survived for millions of years, and it will survive the age of the Internet. Possibly.
The essence of ethics comes from the Golden Rule, and each age learns how best to implement

its simple imperative. It can be done person to person, or in the agora, or on Angie’s List. Compared to the rate at which we evolve, these technologies are flying by in a blur. Before we can figure out one, something else has come along. The details matter less than the simple directive to be mindful of each other’s weaknesses, and to reciprocate fairness.

Tim Bal Belle Mead, NJ

I beg to differ.

“There is nothing new under the sun.”

We do not need another Constitution. We do not need “well-curated agoras”.

What we need is more common sense, less greed, and more honesty, compassion, tolerance and patience. In other words, we don’t need anything new to support a more ethical society.

Howard Los Angeles

In the world today, I don’t observe any great obedience to the Golden Rule and to the ethical (non-ritual) parts of the Ten Commandments. So it’s kind of early to say that obeying them wouldn’t suffice.
Certainly there are technical requirements for somebody to understand what “stealing” is in computer software, or what “false witness” is in describing medical treatments. But once that definition is made, the golden rule and its equivalents (e.g., Kant: Act as though your action would become a universal law) can take you pretty far.

David Jones Rochester NY

We need to stop holding up the Athenians as models of democracy. They kept slaves and routinely sentenced people to death by popular vote!

ACW New Jersey

I agree with you about the Constitution. (Someone tell Scalia, please.).And you had me up to the graf that begins with Anthony Kroman’s lament on the lost lawyer, and the supposed loss of integrity in other professions. Do you really believe there was a time doctors were selfless, unmercenary near-saints? Read Moliere. For that matter, read history; e.g., the inventor of the forceps was as jealous and secretive of his lucrative device as Big Pharma of any of its patents. That there was a time when lawyers were not venal, equivocating opportunists would startle, say, John Webster. Plato and Thucydides knew a bit about democracy and that the system’s more likely to spawn an Alcibiades than a Mr. Smith. And George Orwell, who wrote ‘Such, Such Were the Joys,’ is laughing somewhere at your encomium to teachers. (As is IF Stone, who pretty much took apart the myth of the noble martyr Socrates.)
Things ain’t what they used to be … and they never were.

The 10 Commandments and Golden Rule also won’t wash. ‘Thou shalt have no other gods before me.’ Who, exactly, is ‘me’? ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’? As GBS

pointed out, never do unto others as you would have them do unto you; ‘their tastes may not be the same.’ The OT/NT and general history of revealed religion prove not only are the commandments and rule poor ethical yardsticks, there is no more mischivous creature on earth than a man convinced he is virtuous in the eyes of the lord (any lord).

Kevin Brock Waynesville, NC

We don’t need to reinvent ethics. Rather, we need to reinforce and expand to more and more “neighbors” the basic tenets of ethics we all are familiar with.

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” applies equally to environmental policy as it does to international relations as it does to my barking dog.

“Treat the foreigner in your land as a citizen,” often dismissed as applicable only to the nomadic culture of the desert, applies equally to the conduct of foreign affairs or commerce in a global economy.
Biblical principles like gleaning, the forgiveness of debts, being slow to anger or take offense, taking care of the widow and the fatherless, and universal hospitality, all sound like worthy fundamentals upon which to build an ethical and just society.
There is nothing new in any of that, and nothing that needs reinvention.

Marilyn J Los Angeles

When I was a very small girl, a very long time ago, my father explained the Golden Rule to me and what it means. This was his version of “religion” and he believed that striving to live by this rule would create a better life and a better world. After over sixty years of trying to live by this rule I know he was right.

KiWi Markham ON

Judaeo-Christian morality says the Golden Rule applies only to our immediate neighbours but is not a universal claim? Which Bible is Professor Gardner referring to?

Alan Paris

Kant’s categorical imperative does not depend on “neighborly ethics”. The injunctions to treat strangers well in the Bible do not either. The “ethics of roles” was well-known to St. Thomas Aquinas. The author hardly makes the case that ethics needs to be reinvented. I confess I was relieved when I saw he was a member of neither a history nor a philosophy dept – but depressed to have my prejudices about Education departments confirmed.

David Chowes New York City

AMERICAN ETHICS:

Do on to others as your greed compels you to. If it is illegal, make sure that it is
done with care so you won’t get caught. If indicted call on the most unscurulous members of the

profession which Shakespeare said to kill.

Enough?
SteveH Henderson, NV

The professor’s sophist attempt to extirpate thousands of years of civilization’s wisdom in having created a system of absolute morality (the Ten Commandments) in terms of clearly defined right and wrong does not stand up to the realities of the world (yes world not neighborhood) which we all occupy. Jurisprudence, for example from antiquity to modern legislation (primarily criminal, but civil as well) recognizes the principles of malum in se vis a vis malum prohibitum. If history has taught us anything at all, it is that there is no disinterested arbiter that can be appointed or elected as an elite to judge the rest of us, professional or hoi polloi. Witness the current as well as past practices of the United States Supreme Court or the Security Council of the United Nations. The bright line simplicity of the Ten Commandments tempered by the relative but humanistic percept of the Golden Rule are perfect guides to a moral existence, if only they would be observed by elitists such as the Professor.

Robert Racine, WI

People whose knowledge of the Bible is limited to a fuzzy misquoting and misunderstanding of the 10 commandments should probably refrain from writing about morality or really, anything.

ACW New Jersey

‘God will know his own’ was uttered during the Church’s war on the Cathar heresy, after a soldier asked what to do about a town in which some were faithful and some were heretics, but the troops didn’t know which was which. ‘Kill them all. God will know His own.’ The modern updating, popular on T-shirts and bumper stickers, is ‘kill ’em all, let God sort ’em out.’

A good example of what happens when quotes are removed from their context …

Mark Thomason Clawson, MI

The Golden Rule provides a perfectly adequate answer to those supposedly hard cases. Put yourself in the shoes of each of the other parties, and treat them as you would feel to be fair treatment of yourself. Medical research? “If it was me in that bed or my loved one, my remains being used or those of a loved one . . ..” It works just fine.

Tom Midwest

The problem with agoras in public is the lack of civility and failure to follow the rules of debate that has been hijacked by the extremes. Just listen to any of the programs on talk radio these days. We still have old fashioned township meetings where I live, where many residents attend, listen quietly, respond when allowed, keep their comments civil and never interrupt another speaker. A johnny come lately frothing tea party type was asked politely to either shut up or leave. He were given the option to debate civilly but he declined and appeared much happier outside the township hall bellowing at the top of his lungs and being ignored by everyone. Sort of like it was back when the anti war protests were going on but now it is the other side.

Amused Reader SC

The 10 Commandments are outdated according to the writer as well as the Golden Rule. I guess that prohibitions against murder, adultery, and stealing as well as being good to your neighbor is too old fashioned for enlightened minds. I have always found that the KISS principal (Keep It Simple Stupid) works pretty well. And doing the right thing is not to hard to figure out. If we need complicated agencies to tell us what to do we already have the IRS and the Obama administration who are ready and willing to make those moral and ethical judgments for us in language so complex we don’t understand them.

I think the writer misses the point where we are to live so that we don’t hurt anyone and respect others. It doesn’t take a new Constitution or rewriting the 10 Commandments to let us know how we need to live in relation to our fellow man. All new rules do is to take away equality and replace it with some sort of chaste system where others are put above the “little people”. We already have government for that, we don’t need to lose the few freedoms we have left to glorified lawyers, accountants, and middle managers.

Ethics don’t change except when some people want to take advantage of others using their superior knowledge. We see where that got the Germans with Hitler. Leave the 10 Commandments, Golden Rule, and the Constitution alone. They work fine to protect us from the enlightened minority.

Goackerman Bethesda, Maryland

What a silly — no, make that scary — essay. Our “wise” Masters will tell us what’s good and what’s bad, and what we should do and not do. Define “wise”. I hope journalists reading this essay note that Gardner advocates journalism “trustees” deciding who should be admitted to or expelled from the “profession”. Journalism is not a profession in the classic sense, e.g., there is no specific education, examination, or license required, nor should it be. In a free press, journalists can be hired and fired, not admitted or expelled. As for the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, Gardner seems merely to be venting his spleen because of some recent decisions with which he has disagreed.

JHSM Lake Placid, NY

Trustees, huh? As I recall, Plato called them the Guardians in his Republic. And with all his evocations of Athenian democracy, Prof.
Gardner can’t be unaware of the resemblances between his program and Plato’s. He must also be aware of how deeply contemptuous Plato was of the democratic assemblies of his city. In his fictional Republic, Plato evoked historical Athenian oligarchy and repackaged it as philosophically enlightened despotism.

It important to call professionals to account, absolutely. What bothers me is the notion, implicit here, that once the professionals get their acts together, the common man or woman will not have to concern him or herself with issues that to my mind at least properly belong in the public democratic domain. Prof. Gardner refers to the Athenian assembly and to the New England town

meeting as models for the virtual assemblies of experts he envisages. He seems to believe that these democratic institutions have seen their day, and that the issues of our era are too complex for ordinary people to resolve.
I wish I believed that experts weren’t ordinary, too. Perfectibility, even in right minded people, is not a realistic goal. The American democratic system is based on the Venetian notion that the wicked ambitions of one individual or faction necessarily conflict with those of others. The rivalry and compromise that these conflicts produce can lead to a decent, if imperfect, result.

Oliver Jones Newburyport, MA

“Do onto others?” Shouldn’t you have written “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you?”

John T. Grand Rapids, Michigan

Professionals have an obligation to not only think about themselves and their clients, but also about their role in maintaining the stability of the system. This is what the bankers failed to do in the run up to the financial crisis. In a way, it is a Kantian question: What if all my peers did what I am doing? Would it make the system unstable? In the case of the banks it surely did. It seemed like nobody asked that question. I am disappointed that the business community is not acting like a profession and asking the ethical questions it needs to ask. They have to change their professional culture.

James Currin Stamford, Ct

When Prof. Gardner finally gets down to something concrete, he tells us that we must give up the belief that our constitution contains the solution to all legal disputes. I know of no one, living or dead, who has ever held such a absurd opinion. Our Constitution was and is a compact between the several states to create a national government of limited and defined powers. That is all it is and it would suffice if only the courts would enforce it. What Gardner really means, but won’t say plainly is that the national government should have vastly expanded powers that the Constitution does not permit. As to his vaporous musings about “wise” trustees, they appear to be nothing more than the NYT editorial board writ large.

Martin Weiss mexico, mo

I get what you’re saying, and I agree with your proposal, but, for my own reference, I consolidate, boil these ethical guides, along with those of original doctrines of Jesus, Lao Tzu, Jefferson, and many others. Teilhard de Chardin,Rachel Carson, Lincoln, Madison, Annie Dillard, Edward Abbey, Aldo Leopold, and on and on– to synthesize what they all were getting at. What use is the Bible, what use the Bhagavad-Gita, the I Ching, etc.?
Rawls and Locke and Mill would agree, they were intended to prescribe best practices for group survival and long-term prosperity. That clarifies ethical choices. “Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness”? Unless, by a lie, a life can be saved. And so on. The ultimate value must be life. Preserving, honoring, furthering life is a standard that cuts across all doctrinal differences, unifies the field, so to speak, of ethical dilemmas. In essence, the unified field is staring us in the face– so close we overlook it. Wordsworth and Einstein would have gotten along fine with

Hammurabi, Buddha, Krishna, Jesus, Maimonides, Spinoza and Lao Tse. Hammurabi’s law protecting strangers brought a manifold increase in foreign trade. Abbey’s injunction that “Grown Men Don’t Need Leaders” puts the ethical response-abilty into democratic hands. The synthesis of ethical doctrines may conflict with advice like spreading one’s dogma by the sword, but that can’t ensure group survival, anyway. Heresy is in the eye of the authorities. Common interest must prevail

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February 26, 2014 Your Ancestors, Your Fate

Your Ancestors, Your Fate

By Gregory Clark
February 21, 2014, NYTimes Website. Opinionator                              Click here for a pdf version

Inequality of income and wealth has risen in America since the 1970s, yet a large-scale research study recently found that social mobility hadn’t changed much during that time. How can that be?

The study, by researchers at Harvard and Berkeley, tells only part of the story. It may be true that mobility hasn’t slowed — but, more to the point, mobility has always been slow.

When you look across centuries, and at social status broadly measured — not just income and wealth, but also occupation, education and longevity — social mobility is much slower than many of us believe, or want to believe. This is true in Sweden, a social welfare state; England, where industrial capitalism was born; the United States, one of the most heterogeneous societies in history; and India, a fairly new democracy hobbled by the legacy of caste. Capitalism has not led to pervasive, rapid mobility. Nor have democratization, mass public education, the decline of nepotism, redistributive taxation, the emancipation of women, or even, as in China, socialist revolution.

To a striking extent, your overall life chances can be predicted not just from your parents’ status but also from your great-great-great-grandparents’. The recent study suggests that 10 percent of variation in income can be predicted based on your parents’ earnings. In contrast, my colleagues and I estimate that 50 to 60 percent of variation in overall status is determined by your lineage. The fortunes of high-status families inexorably fall, and those of low-status families rise, toward the average — what social scientists call “regression to the mean” — but the process can take 10 to 15 generations (300 to 450 years), much longer than most social scientists have estimated in the past.

We came to these conclusions after examining reams of data on surnames, a surprisingly strong indicator of social status, in eight countries — Chile, China, England, India, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and the United States — going back centuries. Across all of them, rare or distinctive surnames associated with elite families many generations ago are still disproportionately represented among today’s elites.

Does this imply that individuals have no control over their life outcomes? No. In modern meritocratic societies, success still depends on individual effort. Our findings suggest, however, that the compulsion to strive, the talent to prosper and the ability to overcome failure are strongly inherited. We can’t know for certain what the mechanism of that inheritance is, though we know that genetics plays a surprisingly strong role. Alternative explanations that are in vogue — cultural traits, family economic resources, social networks — don’t hold up to scrutiny.

Because our findings run against the intuition that modernity, and in particular capitalism, has eroded the impact of ancestry on a person’s life chances, I need to explain how we arrived at them.

Let’s start with Sweden, which — like Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway — is one of the world’s most equal societies in terms of income. To our surprise, we found that social mobility in Sweden today was no greater than in Britain or the United States today — or even Sweden in the 18th century.

Sweden still has a nobility. Those nobles no longer hold de facto political power, but their family records are stored by the Riddarhuset (House of Nobility), a society created in 1626. We estimate that about 56,000 Swedes hold rare surnames associated with the three historic tiers of nobles. (Variations on the names of the unfortunate Rosencrantz and Guildenstern of “Hamlet” are on the list.)

Another elite group are Swedes whose ancestors — a rising educated class of clerics, scholars, merchants — Latinized their surnames in the 17th and 18th centuries (like the father of the botanist Carolus Linnaeus). Adopting elite names was limited by law in Sweden in 1901, so a vast majority of people holding them are descended from prominent families.

Given the egalitarian nature of Swedish society, one would expect that people with these elite surnames should be no better off than other Swedes. That isn’t so. In a sample of six Stockholm- area municipalities in 2008, rich and poor, we found that the average taxable income of people with noble names was 44 percent higher than that of people with the common surname Andersson. Those with Latinized names had average taxable incomes 27 percent higher than those named Andersson.

Surnames of titled nobles (counts and barons) are represented in the register of the Swedish Bar Association at six times the rate they occur in the general population (three times the rate, for untitled-noble and Latinized surnames). The same goes for Swedish doctors. Among those who completed master’s theses at Uppsala University from 2000 to 2012, Swedes with elite surnames were overrepresented by 60 to 80 percent compared with those with the common surname prefixes Lund- and Berg-.

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Over centuries, there is movement toward the mean, but it is slow. In three of the Royal Academies of Sweden, half of the members from 1740 to 1769 held one of the elite surnames in our sample; by 2010, only 4 percent did — but these surnames were held by just 0.7 percent of all Swedes, so they were still strongly overrepresented. In short, nearly 100 years of social democratic policies in Sweden, while creating a very egalitarian society, have failed to accelerate social mobility.

What if we go back even further in time — to medieval England?

We estimate that one-tenth of all surnames in contemporary England can be traced to the occupation of a medieval ancestor — names like Smith (the most common surname in the United States, England and Australia), Baker, Butler, Carter, Chamberlain, Cook, Shepherd, Stewart and Wright. Tax records suggest that most surnames became heritable by 1300.

We compared the frequency of these common surnames in the population as a whole against elite groups, as drawn from several sources, including membership rolls at Oxford and Cambridge, dating as far back as 1170, and probate records from 1384 onward.

We found that late medieval England was no less mobile than modern England — contrary to the common assumption of a static feudal order. It took just seven generations for the successful descendants of illiterate village artisans of 1300 to be incorporated fully into the educated elite of 1500 — that is, the frequency of their names in the Oxbridge rolls reached the level around where it is today. By 1620, according to probate records, people with names like Butcher and Baker had nearly as much wealth as people with high-status surnames like Rochester and Radcliffe.

Take Chaucer. A commoner by birth — his name probably comes from the French word for shoemaker — he became a courtier, a diplomat and a member of Parliament, and his great-great- grandson was even briefly considered heir to the throne during the reign of Richard III.

Of course, mobility, in medieval times as now, worked both ways. Just as Chaucer’s progeny prospered, other previously well-off families declined. The medieval noble surname Cholmondeley was, by the 19th century, held by a good number of farm laborers.

In any generation, happy accidents (including extraordinary talent) will produce new high-status families. It is impossible to predict which particular families are likely to experience such boosts. What is predictable is what the path to elite status will look like, and the path back to the mean. Both happen at a very slow pace.

For all the creative destruction unleashed by capitalism, the industrial revolution did not accelerate mobility. Looking at 181 rare surnames held by the wealthiest 15 percent of English and Welsh people in the mid-19th century — to be clear, these were not the same elite surnames as in the medieval era — we found that people with these surnames who died between 1999 and 2012 were more than three times as wealthy as the average person.

If your surname is rare, and someone with that surname attended Oxford or Cambridge around 1800, your odds of being enrolled at those universities are nearly four times greater than the average person. This slowness of mobility has persisted despite a vast expansion in public

financing for secondary and university education, and the adoption of much more open and meritocratic admissions at both schools.

We selected a sampling of high- and low-status American surnames. The elite ones were held by descendants of Ivy League alumni who graduated by 1850, exceptionally wealthy people with rare surnames in 1923-24 (when public inspection of income-tax payments was legal) and Ashkenazi Jews. The low-status names were associated with black Americans whose ancestors most likely arrived as slaves, and the descendants of French colonists in North America before 1763.

We chose only surnames closely correlated with these subgroups — for example, Rabinowitz for American Jews, and Washington for black Americans.

We used two indicators of social status: the American Medical Association’s directory of physicians and registries of licensed attorneys, along with their dates of registration, in 25 states, covering 74 percent of the population.

In the early to mid-20th century we found the expected regression toward the mean for all of these groups, except for Jews and blacks — which reflects the reality of quotas that had barred Jews from many elite schools, and of racial segregation, which was not fully outlawed until the 1960s.

Starting in the 1970s, Jews began, over all, a decline in social status, while blacks began a corresponding rise, at least as measured by the doctors’ directory. But both trends are very slow. At the current rate, for example, it will be 300 years before Ashkenazi Jews cease to be overrepresented among American doctors, and even 200 years from now the descendants of enslaved African-Americans will still be underrepresented.

Family names tell you, for better or worse, a lot: The average life span of an American with the typically Jewish surname Katz is 80.2 years, compared with 64.6 years for those with the surname Begay (or Begaye), which is strongly associated with Native Americans. Heberts, whites of New France descent, live on average three years less than Dohertys, whites of Irish descent.

But to be clear, we found no evidence that certain racial groups innately did better than others. Very high-status groups in America include Ashkenazi Jews, Egyptian Copts, Iranian Muslims, Indian Hindus and Christians, and West Africans. The descendants of French Canadian settlers don’t suffer racial discrimination, but their upward mobility, like that of blacks, has been slow.

Chen (a common Chinese surname) is of higher status than Churchill. Appiah (a Ghanaian surname) is higher than Olson (or Olsen), a common white surname of average status. Very little information about status can be surmised by the most common American surnames — the top five are Smith, Johnson, Williams, Brown and Jones, which all originated in England — because they are held by a mix of whites and blacks.

Our findings were replicated in Chile, India, Japan, South Korea and, surprisingly, China, which stands out as a demonstration of the resilience of status — even after a Communist revolution nearly unparalleled in its ferocity, class hatred and mass displacement.

Hundreds of thousands of relatively prosperous mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan with the Nationalists in the late 1940s. Under Communist agrarian reform, as much as 43 percent of all land was seized and redistributed. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 saw purges of scholars and other former elites and “class enemies.”

In China, there are only about 4,000 surnames; the 100 most common are held by nearly 85 percent of the population. Yet we were able to identify 13 rare surnames that were exceptionally overrepresented among successful candidates in imperial examinations in the 19th century. Remarkably, holders of these 13 surnames are disproportionately found now among professors and students at elite universities, government officials, and heads of corporate boards. Social mobility in the Communist era has accelerated, but by very little. Mao failed.

These findings may surprise two groups that are often politically opposed: those who believe that certain “cultures” are higher-achieving than others and those who attribute success to family resources and social networks.

Culture is a nebulous category and it can’t explain the constant regression of family status — from the top and the bottom. High-status social groups in America are astonishingly diverse. There are representatives from nearly every major religious and ethnic group in the world — except for the group that led to the argument for culture as the foundation of social success: white European Protestants. Muslims are low-status in much of India and Europe, but Iranian Muslims are among the most elite of all groups in America.

Family resources and social networks are not irrelevant. Evidence has been found that programs from early childhood education to socioeconomic and racial classroom integration can yield lasting benefits for poor children. But the potential of such programs to alter the overall rate of social mobility in any major way is low. The societies that invest the most in helping disadvantaged children, like the Nordic countries, have produced absolute, commendable benefits for these children, but they have not changed their relative social position.

The notion of genetic transmission of “social competence” — some mysterious mix of drive and ability — may unsettle us. But studies of adoption, in some ways the most dramatic of social interventions, support this view. A number of studies of adopted children in the United States and Nordic countries show convincingly that their life chances are more strongly predicted from their biological parents than their adoptive families. In America, for example, the I.Q. of adopted children correlates with their adoptive parents’ when they are young, but the correlation is close to zero by adulthood. There is a low correlation between the incomes and educational attainment of adopted children and those of their adoptive parents.

These studies, along with studies of correlations across various types of siblings (identical twins, fraternal twins, half siblings) suggest that genetics is the main carrier of social status.

If we are right that nature predominates over nurture, and explains the low rate of social mobility, is that inherently a tragedy? It depends on your point of view.

The idea that low-status ancestors might keep someone down many generations later runs against most people’s notions of fairness. But at the same time, the large investments made by the super-

elite in their kids — like those of the Manhattan hedge-funders who spend a fortune on preschool — are of no avail in preventing long-run downward mobility.

Our findings do suggest that intermarriage among people of different strata will raise mobility over time. India, we found, has exceptionally low mobility in part because religion and caste have barred intermarriage. As long as mating is assortative — partners are of similar social status, regardless of ethnic, national or religious background — social mobility will remain low.

As the political theorist John Rawls suggested in his landmark work “A Theory of
Justice” (1971), innate differences in talent and drive mean that, to create a fair society, the disadvantages of low social status should be limited. We are not suggesting that the fact of slow mobility means that policies to lift up the lives of the disadvantaged are for naught — quite the opposite. Sweden is, for the less well off, a better place to live than the United States, and that is a good thing. And opportunities for people to flourish to the best of their abilities are essential.

Large-scale, rapid social mobility is impossible to legislate. What governments can do is ameliorate the effects of life’s inherent unfairness. Where we will fall within the social spectrum is largely fated at birth. Given that fact, we have to decide how much reward, or punishment, should be attached to what is ultimately fickle and arbitrary, the lottery of your lineage.

Gregory Clark is a professor of economics at the University of California, Davis, and the author of “The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility.”

A version of this article appears in print on 02/23/2014, on page SR1 of the NewYork edition with the headline: Your Ancestors, Your Fate
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William J. Keith

Macomb, Illinois Although it may be slow, if our children, whether we are prosperous or poor, are likely to eventually return to the average, it seems like the most productive thing we can do to better their lot is to focus on improving the lot of the average.
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Orazio New York 3 days ago
Regarding the inference of genetic transmission as measured by surnames I would like to point out that the genetic inheritance is reduced by 50% with each succeeding generation. Thus, a high status person today received 50% of his/her genes from each parent, 25% from each grandparent, 12.5% from each great grandparent, 6.25% from each great, great and 3.125% from each great, great, great-grandparent. Or in other words, each of us has 2 parents, 4 grandparents, 8 great grandparents, 16 great, greats and 32 great, great, great grandparents. However, one’s surname is transmitted intact and undivided from only one of these 32 great, great, greats to whom the individual is 96.875% genetically unrelated. Thus, it seems more plausible to me that admission committees, professional societies and society in general are influenced by surnames that are recognizable and associated with higher social status – think legacy admissions to Ivy League universities. The slow decay of social status may simply reflect the time necessary for surname recognizability to fade from memory.
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SP Singapore Yesterday

This article pushes an odd theory – it equates surnames with genetic identity. This makes no sense – I got only 25% of my DNA from my father’s father, and only 0.1% of my DNA from my male-lineage ancestor ten steps up the paternal line. In other words, surname continuity does not imply genetic identity – the resemblance fades very rapidly! I don’t think the author understands this point.
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Also, if Gregory Clark believes that blacks in America compete on a level playing field, he is completely deluded – one wonders which planet he was on when he wrote this piece.
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Lastly, the effects of poverty on brain development, metabolic health and other traits important for social success have all been very well documented. Perhaps Mr Clark got carried away by his research into surnames – he seems to have completely ignored every other factor.
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volutes Switzerland
This article presents an interesting statistical/historical analysis and then jumps to a conclusion that the reason must be predominantly because of genetical factors.
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The evasive dismissal in the article of family resources and social networks as an explanation of the situation described is extraordinarily short. The hint that racial classroom integration programs did not change the relative social position of their recipients does not explain much: millions of dollars for starting a company, intimate life and business connections with wealthy people and acquired social patterns for fending life challenges are not something that can just be taught in one classroom program.
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Therefore, I wonder whether the authors are following a hidden agenda.
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Doug R. New Jersey 2 days ago
The 1% in America have rigged the game by creating a tax structure that gives them all the advantages & the rest of us all the cost. The most prosperous families have advantages in education & connections. You rigged your game by selecting names by a subjective criteria & looking for results to prove your point. You begin with elite names in Sweden citing the Royal Academy membership where most elite surnames have declined from 50% 250 years ago to 4% today. Doesn’t that prove the opposite point. Sweden has really only been a democratic society since the end of WW 1 less than a hundred years ago. That’s a pretty quick decline in status for those elite families in that time.

May I suggest you study orphans with elite names & without. No family to help, or to pay for better educational opportunities, no nepotism. That might give more objective results.
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Changed and Changed Back San Francisco CA I am a woman. I bear my father’s family name but I am also the child of my mother who bore the family name of her father. Should my social status be aligned with my father and paternal grandfather? how about my son who bears the family name of his father? Failing to address the issue the relationship of naming to gender is egregious although using the data available may be perfectly acceptable as a sampling technique.

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Texancan Ranchotex
Great study but I would like to add two factors: 1) the assets and connections for the upper class provide their children a superior (and unfair) advantage for generations to come 2) same for recognition and justice from the Courts In addition, children of lower class will have to work harder
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jcb Portland, OR
Demonstrating by surname the persistence of “genetic” traits influencing social mobility is so scattershot that it confuses. For example, by taking changes in professional affiliation as a measure of social mobility (in, e.g., Sweden) it ignores the persistence of paternal models that determine the occupation of sons (but not daughters). There is an overwhelming survivors bias toward the male, primo-genetic line. Lawyer fathers, lawyer sons.
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The analysis lacks any comparative standard of low-, medium-, or high- social mobility. Or of the long-, medium-, or short- period over which it is supposed to occur. And it confuses social mobility (rate and degree of change) with persistence of inequality (difference in wealth).
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It’s unclear whether, e.g., a comparison of high status surnames in Swedish Royal Academies in the 18th and 21st century revealing a decline of 92% (from 50% to 4%) signals mobility, or why “mobility” is measured by overrepresentation in current Swedish population (do they mean “inequality”?)– or whether the 92% rise in non-elite academy surnames is high upward mobility. (The same problem with the Chinese example: “disproportion” is not mobility.)
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But the larger problem is simply resorting to “genes” as an explanatory catch-all after eliminating (to their satisfaction) other explanations. We’ve reached the degree of precision in genetic research where a reader is entitled to electron-microscopic images in an appendix: Which genes– on which chromosomes?
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rjnyc NYC
To take just one of many examples of the inadequacy of this author’s methodology, look at how he tests mobility in the U.S. A serious test would measure the mobility of the descendants of high status Anglo Americans against that of the descendants of low status Anglo Americans, so that the results would not be corrupted by the influence of racial prejudice–a factor that surely has limited mobility for a certain minority but not for all. This author however does not perform such a comparison; rather, he compares the mobility of Anglo Americans to that of African Americans. Moreover, he treats the initial status of Ashkenazi Jews as if it were no different from the status of the highest status Anglo Americans–a laughable assumption, and also fails to consider changes to the status of American Jews resulting from the massive immigration in the late 19th Century, which brought a population of Jews unlike the one here before that. Either the author’s methodology is utterly inept, or else the relevant details have not been included, so that the author has essentially provided nothing to the reader except unsupported assertions.
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A Cranky Alumna Ohio Yesterday
I was an untraditional student at an elite college in the 70s, by virtue of gender, economic status, geography, and family background. After watching the lifetime career trajectories of my peers and, eventually, our children, I’ve become increasingly convinced that elite status is maintained more by a narrowly circumscribed world view than by intelligence, work ethic, social skills, or even startup funds or family connections.
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Those of us from diverse backgrounds face a nearly infinite array of life choices: we can listen to our hearts, follow our dreams, and use our intelligence and our education to pursue the life that’s right for us, unfettered, for the most part, by status issues.
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The options of our high-status peers are, by contrast, tightly circumscribed: it’s simply not acceptable to be “just” a teacher or “just” a nurse or “just” a photographer or a researcher or a social worker. So only the truly rebellious make those choices. Everyone else does their part to maintain the family status, but we shouldn’t be surprised when the lawyer (who dreamed of coaching basketball) and the banker (who wanted to write children’s stories) prove again and again that they’re only in it for the money.
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LR NYC Yesterday
This is completely illogical and I can’t believe the NYT published this irresponsible and pernicious argument for a genetic component to success. The author treats it as axiomatic that surnames can be seen tracing gene inheritance. But surnames pass only from father to son to son to son (until very recently). As they are inherited, the sons’ genes are mixed with innumerable other ancestors’, equally. One’s number of ancestors doubles with each generation. You have about 1/32 of each of your great-great-grandparents’ genomes, regardless of whose last name you have. You have a 1 out of 32 chance of having great-great-grandpa Rockefeller’s “success gene,” and so do all of his descendants who DON’T have his last name (i.e., who are descended from his daughters). So the notion that we can assume that these last names reliably track the inheritance of a success gene is absurd.
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The author states that genes must be responsible for his findings, because neither culture nor inherited social advantages explain those findings. Well, just because you’ve ruled out A and B doesn’t mean that C is correct. You may need to come up with a D. You may need to look again at A or B. Etc. Then, the author cites evidence of adoption studies, which only measure the relation of one generation (adopted child) to previous generation (biological parents). This has nothing to do with proving his assertion of a genetic component influencing status across 15 generations. In sum, preposterous.
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Bruce Crossan Lebanon, OR
So the authors out with an idea and then searched and searched for measurements that would support (at least in their minds) their conclusions. I realize that finding suitable data to analyze, for the question you wish to research, can be challenging; however, the wide divergence of apples and oranges comparisons brings the conclusions into doubt.

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Did the authors look at why people have the last names that they do; in any countries other than England (Smith etc). How did people who lacked surnames, like emancipated slaves choose their last names? Could Washington or Jefferson be a hint of a cultural influence? How about the Schmitts that came to America and changed their names to Smith, so that they blended into the country they moved to. Doesn’t the fact that the WASPs in North America wiped out most of the indigenous population have a cultural effect on Native American surnames? Did a lot of rich Irish doctors and businessmen come to America because there was social unrest that threatened to take away their wealth? No?: How about the Iranians? Seems to me that where their from and why they came could have a large effect on rare last names that are identified with status.

I can find alternate explanations for every surmise that the authors make, in countries/cultures I’m familiar with. So I’m sorry, the arguments presented are not convincing. bc
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RTB Washington, DC

So the authors leap from the observation that social status changes three or four generations, which is more slowly than our political myths would suggest, to the conclusion that “genetics” is the most likely cause. This is a rather curious conclusion given that three or four generations is a nanosecond in terms of significant genetic change among humans.
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The much better conclusion is that high status families are extraordinarily good at preserving their advantages regardless of the political system in which they exist.
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This book appears to be one of a growing number arguing for the inherent superiority of some people over others while strenuously avoiding terms like superiority. The claim that some are born to lead and rule and others to be ruled over is as old as human civilization. This book is merely a restatement of that tiresome idea.
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ADRIAN San Francisco, CA
Oh, but the article points you away from mobility altogether:
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“As the political theorist John Rawls suggested in his landmark work “A Theory of
Justice” (1971), innate differences in talent and drive mean that, to create a fair society, the disadvantages of low social status should be limited. We are not suggesting that the fact of slow mobility means that policies to lift up the lives of the disadvantaged are for naught — quite the opposite. Sweden is, for the less well off, a better place to live than the United States, and that is a good thing. And opportunities for people to flourish to the best of their abilities are essential.” !
So what can governments do? Never mind mobility! But organically promote opportunities for people to flourish to the best of their abilities, however great or not so great such abilities may be.
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Jerry Beilinson New York, NY Yesterday

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How bizarre to include Ashkenazi Jews. In other case, the author looks at a concrete marker of past elite status: noble rank, admission to Oxford, slavery. Then, he just assumes that Jews were elites in early 20th century America without presenting evidence. In reality, the millions of Jews flooding the U.S. from Eastern Europe at that time tended to arrive in poverty, and find work in sweatshops, as pushcart peddlers, ice-delivery men, and so on. Newspaper columnists at the time complained about Jews because they were considered poor, dirty, uneducated, etc. This is my ancestry, and none of my grandparents had more than an 8th grade education. From what I’ve read and my parents tell me, that was typical. In the Jewish neighborhoods of the Lower East Side and Brooklyn, no one of their generation knew any adult with a college education, or anyone who worked in a white-collar setting of any kind. Among my parents’ generation, who became adults in the 1950s, typical professions included teaching, the civil service, doctors, and accountants: Expressly areas where ancestry could be overcome by earning a degree and taking a test. (Those accomplishments were made possible by essentially free tuition through New York City’s public universities and the GI bill.) Certainly, there were a few prominent Jews in the United States in the 19th century, just as their were a few prominent Irish Catholics and even African-Americans. But they weren’t at all typical.

Justice Holmes Charleston Yesterday
Nothing like an article that tells us that what we thought was bad isn’t so we can just stop complaining and allow the rich to continue getting richer. As a product of the American dream I can tell you that social and economic mobility was once the norm. Working class parents saw their children graduate high school, college and law school. They saw them succeed in their chosen fields and become economically comfortable and stable. Then, the corporations and the really, really rich woke up. They realized that those upwardly mobile lawyers, teachers, CPAs and others were making changes, protecting unions, consumers and holding the government agencies accountable. well, we couldn’t have that. It was time to bring the hammer down. Crush the unions that helped the middle class grow; disarm the concumers and the government agencies that regulated the corporations and banks and make sure working class and middle class kids could not longer afford college and while you are at it tell them that college is just an elitist romp so they will thank you for it.
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Has the deck always been stacked agains the working class in this and other countries? Of course. But the US was different, working class kids had a shot. Now they don’t and minority kids well it hasn’t gotten easier for them either. But thanks to articles like this we should all just be quite because well its always been this way. I say malarkey.

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February 12, 2014 Morals

Morals and Markets

Armin Falk,  Nora Szech –  Abstract    Editor’s Summary   Click here for a pdf version

The possibility that market interaction may erode moral values is a long-standing, but controversial, hypothesis in the social sciences, ethics, and philosophy. To date, empirical evidence on decay of moral values through market interaction has been scarce. We present controlled experimental evidence on how market interaction changes how human subjects value harm and damage done to third parties. In the experiment, subjects decide between either saving the life of a mouse or receiving money. We compare individual decisions to those made in a bilateral and a multilateral market. In both markets, the willingness to kill the mouse is substantially higher than in individual decisions. Furthermore, in the multilateral market, prices for life deteriorate tremendously. In contrast, for morally neutral consumption choices, differences between institutions are small.

It is a pervasive feature of market interaction to impose costs on uninvolved third parties. Producing and trading goods often creates negative externalities, such as detrimental working conditions for workers, possibly associated with reduced life expectancy, child labor, suffering of animals, or environmental damage. People who participate in markets by buying such goods often seem to act against their own moral standards. The risk of moral decay through market interaction has been discussed in politics, ethics, and in the social sciences (1–7). Observing that with technological progress and the increasing ubiquity of market ideas, markets continue to enter further and further into domains of our social life (8), political philosopher Michael Sandel has recently reemphasized this critique, stating that “we have to ask where markets belong—and where they don’t. And we can’t answer this question without deliberating about the meaning and purpose of goods, and the values that should govern them” (9). The relationship between markets and values has received attention both in theoretical work (10, 11) and in empirical cross-sectional studies that compare the level of prosociality across different market societies and cultures (12–14). Identifying a causal effect of markets on values is difficult with cross-sectional or historical data, however, simply because institutions and values coevolve. Moreover, comparing values across societies implies comparing a set of multiple institutions at the same time with unknown and possibly interacting features. For example, markets are observed in very different legal systems, which renders the isolation of the effects of “markets” across societies extremely difficult. For these reasons, we implemented a controlled environment by randomly assigning subjects to different institutions. This allows identifying a causal effect of institutions on outcomes. Our evidence shows that market interaction causally affects the willingness to accept severe, negative consequences for a third party.

The Mouse Paradigm

Our paradigm for studying moral values and detrimental effects on third parties is the trade-off between a mouse life and money. In our main treatments, human subjects faced the decision to either receive no money and to save the life of a mouse, or to earn money and to accept the killing of a mouse. This paradigm involves a drastic and irreversible decision and is well suited for studying moral conflict: Although the content of morality is culturally determined and time and space contingent, there exists a basic consensus that harming others in an unjustified and intentional way is considered as immoral (15).

In all treatments of the experiment (16), which was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn, subjects were explicitly informed about the consequences of their decision. They knew that their mouse was a young and healthy mouse, which in case it survived would in expectation live for about 2 years in an appropriate, enriched environment, jointly with a few other mice. For illustrative purposes, we presented to subjects the picture of a mouse on an instruction screen (fig. S1). The instructions informed subjects explicitly about the killing process, in case they decided to kill their mouse. The killing process was also shown in a short video that was presented to subjects (17).

The mice used in the experiment were so-called “surplus” mice: They were bred for animal experiments, but turned out to be unsuited for study, e.g., because some specific gene manipulation had failed. They were perfectly healthy, but keeping them alive would have been costly. Although it was true that the mice would live or be killed based on the decisions of subjects in the experiment, the default for this population of mice was to be killed, as is common practice in laboratories conducting animal experiments. Subjects were informed explicitly about the default in a postexperimental debriefing (18). Mice that were chosen to survive because of subjects’ decisions were purchased by the experimenters and kept in an appropriate, enriched environment. Thus, these mice survived precisely as stated in the instructions. As a consequence of our experiment, many mice that would otherwise have been killed right away were allowed to live for roughly 2 years.

Markets are institutions where sellers and buyers interact and can trade items. Trade occurs whenever a seller and a buyer agree on a price. For our main result, we analyzed three different conditions (see table S1): an individual treatment in which subjects decided between the life of their mouse and a given monetary amount, a bilateral trading market, and a multilateral trading market. Treatment assignment was random. The individual treatment serves as a benchmark and comparison standard for decisions made in markets. The bilateral market is the most basic form of a market situation with one buyer and one seller bargaining over prices in order to trade. In the multilateral market, many buyers and sellers potentially trade with each other. In comparing decisions from the individual treatment to decisions made in markets, we abstract away from the question of whether a good is priced at all. In all treatments, subjects could exchange life for money.

In the individual treatment, subjects faced a simple binary choice, labeled option A and option B. Option A implied that the mouse would survive and that the subject would receive no money. Option B implied the killing of the mouse and receiving 10 euros. This treatment informs us about the fraction of subjects who are willing to kill the mouse for 10 euros. One hundred and twenty-four subjects participated in this treatment.

To study markets, we implemented the so-called double auction market institution, which is widely used in economics to investigate market outcomes [for an overview, see (19)]. In the bilateral double auction market, one seller and one buyer bargained over killing a mouse for a total gain of 20 euros that the two parties could split up between themselves. The seller was endowed with a mouse. As in the individual treatment, he or she was explicitly told that the “life of the mouse is entrusted to your care.” Bargaining over the 20 euros was conducted during a continuous auction, i.e., buyer and seller could make as many price offers as they liked (16). If a buyer and a seller agreed on a trade, the buyer received 20 euros minus the price agreed upon. The seller received the price. In addition, the mouse of the seller was killed, reflecting a situation in which trade takes place to the detriment of a third party. If a seller or a buyer did not trade, earnings for both were zero and the mouse survived. A seller in the bilateral market was in the same situation as a subject in the individual treatment in that he or she could either refuse a monetary amount or accept a monetary amount and kill a mouse. Subjects were told that no market participant was forced to make price offers or to accept an offer, that their mouse would be killed only if a trade occurred, and that the mouse would survive if they decided not to trade. There were 10 trading periods. Seventy-two subjects participated in this treatment.

The multilateral double auction market treatment was exactly like the bilateral market treatment, except that in this condition seven buyers and nine sellers bargained over prices (16). The nine sellers were all endowed with one mouse each. Subjects on both sides of the market could make as many price offers as they liked. All subjects could accept a price offer from the other side of the market. Available price offers of both market sides were always shown on a screen. Once a price offer of a trader was accepted, trade occurred implying the killing of a mouse. Payoff consequences were identical to those of the bilateral market. There were 10 periods. We ran six sessions with a total of 96 subjects.

To allow for further analyses, we ran several additional treatments (for details see below). In the individual price-list treatment, we offered subjects a menu of prices to elicit the monetary amount needed to pay subjects to make them indifferent between killing and receiving money. To establish a benchmark in terms of how markets affect morally neutral values, we conducted an individual price-list treatment and a multilateral market treatment analogously to the mouse treatments, but for a consumption good. Finally, we ran two further control treatments based on the individual treatment. In sum, we ran nine treatments with a total of 787 subjects.

Our key hypothesis was that markets would display a tendency to erode moral standards, relative to individual decision-making, because of three essential features of market interaction. First, in markets, it takes two people who agree on trading to complete a trade, implying that responsibility and feelings of guilt may be shared and thus diminished (20, 21). Second, market interaction reveals social information about prevailing norms. Observing others trading and ignoring moral standards may make the pursuit of self-interest ethically permissible, leading further individuals to engage in trade. In addition, the mere existence of a market may provide social information about the appropriateness of trading, rendering the killing of mice more allowable (22, 23). Third, markets provide a strong framing and focus on materialistic aspects such as bargaining, negotiation, and competition, and may divert attention from possible adverse consequences and moral implications of trading (11, 24). In contrast to our market conditions, subjects in the individual condition do not interact with other subjects and therefore receive no social information, do not share responsibility if they trade, and are not exposed to a market framing.

These three features are present in all markets, even in simple bilateral markets. In addition, in the multilateral market with its presence of competing sellers, the notion of being pivotal may be diffused as well (25); unless a seller cares specifically about his own mouse, he may argue that if he does not trade his mouse with some buyer, another seller may conclude the trade with that buyer, selling and killing his mouse. This common feature of markets may make subjects feel less responsible, rendering it more difficult to sustain moral values even if values per se remain unchanged. In sum, we therefore expected a higher willingness to kill in the bilateral and the multilateral market compared to individual decision-making. In addition, owing to notions of being less pivotal, the killing rate was expected to be even higher in the multilateral than in the bilateral market. We further hypothesized that the decay of moral values would also be reflected in prices, such that mice would be killed for lower prices in the market treatments compared to the individual treatments. Finally, we studied markets where the cost of trading involves opportunity costs of consumption rather than moral costs. For these morally neutral consumption good markets, we hypothesized no decline of values through market interaction.

Markets Erode Moral Values

Figure 1 shows our main result. Given our interest in studying the effects of institutions on moral valuations in a given population, we compare the fractions of subjects who are willing to agree to the killing in the individual treatment, the bilateral market, and the multilateral market for monetary amounts below or equal to 10 euros (26). For both markets, fractions are calculated with the lowest prices accepted by sellers in actually concluded trades. We focus on lowest accepted prices to approximate from above sellers’ reservation values for killing a mouse.

Fig. 1.  Market interaction erodes moral values, relative to individually stated preferences: fractions of subjects who are willing to kill a mouse for monetary amounts below or equal to 10 euros in the individual treatment, the bilateral market, and the multilateral market. For both markets, fractions are calculated using the lowest prices accepted by sellers in actually concluded trades. Error bars show standard deviations at the means. Differences between the individual treatment and markets are significant at the 1% level. Individual versus bilateral market: P < 0.01, n = 160 (two-sample test of proportions). Individual versus multilateral market: P < 0.01, n = 178 (two-sample test of proportions). The difference between markets is not statistically significant.

In the individual decision treatment, 45.9% of subjects were willing to kill their mouse for 10 euros. In contrast, 72.2% of sellers in the bilateral market were willing to trade for prices below or equal to 10 euros. The increase in willingness to kill relative to the individual condition is statistically significant (P < 0.01, n = 160, two-sample test of proportions) (16). In the multilateral market, the willingness to kill was also substantially higher compared to the individual condition: 75.9% of sellers were willing to kill a mouse for less than or equal to 10 euros (P < 0.01, n = 178, two-sample test of proportions). This is actually a lower bound because in a given period, only seven of the nine sellers could trade at all.

To provide a more detailed understanding of the effects of markets on morals, we implemented an additional individual treatment, the individual price-list treatment. This treatment informs us about how much money subjects would need to receive in the individual condition to yield a similarly high killing rate as in markets. In this treatment, subjects faced an increasing price-list, which is a standard procedure for eliciting individual values and preferences in an incentive-compatible way. As in the individual treatment, subjects were shown a list of binary alternatives, labeled option A and option B. Option A implied that the mouse would survive and that the subject would receive no money. Option A was the same in each decision row. Option B implied the killing of the mouse and the receipt of a monetary amount. Monetary amounts associated with killing the mouse increased from row to row, starting from 2.50 up to 50 euros, in steps of 2.50. Subjects were informed that one choice situation would be randomly selected after all choices had been made. The choice in this situation would be implemented, including payment consequences and, in case option B had been chosen, the killing of the mouse. The switching point from option A to option B informs us about the minimum monetary amount that makes a subject willing to kill the mouse, i.e., the moral value attached to the life of the mouse. The earlier a subject switches, the less he or she values the life of his or her mouse relative to earning money. Despite differences in elicitation procedures, including randomness of the selected choice, the fractions of subjects willing to kill for 10 euros or less were almost identical between the individual and the individual price-list treatment (45.9 versus 42.7% of subjects, respectively; P = 0.636, n = 220, two-sample test of proportions) (fig. S2). Ninety-six subjects participated in the individual price-list treatment.

As shown above, in the bilateral trading market, 72.2% of sellers were willing to trade for prices below or equal to 10 euros. In comparison, in the individual price-list treatment, a similarly high willingness to kill (71.9%) was reached only for monetary amounts of 47.50 euros. Thus, it is necessary for subjects to receive considerably more money in the individual than in the market condition to observe a comparable willingness to kill. Turning to the multilateral market, a similar picture emerges. Here the killing rate was 75.9% for prices below or equal to 10 euros. A similar rate in the individual price-list treatment would require paying subjects monetary amounts above 50 euros. In line with our hypothesis, actual prices in the multilateral market were much lower than 10 euros, however (Fig. 2). The overall average price level was only 5.1 euros (27). In the individual price-list condition, the fraction of subjects who were willing to kill the mouse for 5 euros was only 34.4%. Thus, for prices that actually evolved in the multilateral market, the willingness to kill was much higher than in the individual price-list condition.

Fig. 2.  Evolution of trading prices in the multilateral mouse market and the multilateral coupon market (means over all trades). The downward trend in prices in the mouse market is significant (P = 0.006, n = 297, random effects regression). No significant price trend is observed in the coupon market (P = 0.319, n = 233, random effects regression).

The price-list treatment can also be used to illustrate the decay in valuations in terms of the predicted fraction of trade (16). Assuming that valuations in the price-list condition and the bilateral market were the same, we can use valuations from the price list to simulate the predicted trade probability in the bilateral market. The simulated trade fraction is 25.9%, which is in sharp contrast to the actually observed trade frequency of 47.7% in the bilateral market (P < 0.01, n = 168, two-sample test of proportions). This provides a further confirmation that valuations for mice have declined considerably.

Moral Versus Morally Neutral Values

The final step of the analysis compares decay in moral versus morally neutral values. We hypothesized that for moral values the decay is more pronounced than for private consumption values, where trading involves opportunity costs of consumption rather than costs to third parties. To test this, we ran two additional treatments, identical to the multilateral market and the individual price-list treatment but using consumption goods. The good we considered was a coupon that could be used to buy products at the merchandising shop of the University of Bonn (16). In both treatments, the price-list and the market treatment, subjects were endowed with a coupon. In case they accepted a monetary amount (in the price-list condition) or decided to trade (in the market condition), they had to return their coupon, which was then invalidated. Parameters, instructions, and procedural details were identical to the mouse treatments. Thus, consequences were similar in the mouse and the coupon treatments, except that in the latter, the cost of trading involved opportunity costs of consumption rather than moral costs, i.e., loss and invalidation of a coupon versus killing of a mouse.

To assess the effect of markets on moral versus private consumption values, we use valuations from the individual price-list conditions and compare them to valuations in the respective multilateral markets (16). The dependent variable is a subject’s minimum trading price. Running Tobit and interval regressions, we find that in the mouse treatments, there is a strong negative and statistically significant effect of market interaction. Thus, for a given monetary amount, subjects reveal a higher willingness to kill in markets than in the individual condition. For coupons, the effect of markets is much smaller and insignificant. We also find that the effects of markets differ significantly between mice and coupons (16). In addition, we observe a difference in the price dynamic between multilateral mouse and coupon markets (Fig. 2). In the mouse market, average prices start at rather low levels (compared to the individual condition) and decline from 6.4 euros in the first period to levels as low as 4.5 euros in the final period. This decline in prices is statistically significant (P = 0.006, n = 297, random fixed effects regression). The downward trend provides a further indication of moral decay in the mouse market and is suggestive of social learning and endogenous social norm formation. Intuitively, observing low trading prices in the market may make it normatively acceptable to offer or accept low prices as well (16). In contrast to the downward trend in prices in the mouse market, no significant price trend is observed in the coupon market (P = 0.319, n = 233, random fixed effects regression). The analysis thus reveals a systematic difference between markets involving moral versus morally neutral values: When identical procedures, parameters, and market institutions are used, moral values decline significantly more than values that are morally neutral.

Whereas prices decline in the multilateral mouse market, trade volumes in both bilateral and multilateral markets are constant across periods, suggesting that a number of subjects were not tempted to engage in trading. Apparently, markets did not erode values of all subjects (16). We speculate that subjects who refused to exchange money for mouse life at all may have followed a rule-based, e.g., Kantian, ethic: “… everything has either price or dignity. Whatever has price can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever, on the other hand, is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity” (16, 28).

Robustness and Discussion

Three potential concerns may be raised with respect to our main finding. First, one could argue that we observe the main treatment effect because total surplus was greater in markets than in the individual condition (20 versus 10 euros). If traders dispose of social preferences, they may have cared not only about their own payoff but also attached some value to the payoff of the other trader (buyer). We therefore ran a control condition, which was identical to the individual condition but in which we introduced a second passive participant. One hundred and sixteen subjects took part in this control treatment, with 58 subjects participating in the role of active decision-makers. A passive participant received 10 euros if the active participant decided to kill the mouse (such that the death of a mouse generated a total surplus of 20 euros as in the market treatments). The observed fraction of killing among subjects in the active role is 44.8%. This fraction is significantly different from fractions in both market conditions (bilateral market, P = 0.009, n = 94, and multilateral market, P = 0.001, n = 112, two-sample test of proportions). Furthermore, this fraction is remarkably similar to the individual condition (P = 0.890, n = 182, two-sample test of proportions).

Second, subjects may have perceived killing the mouse as a side-effect of the act of trading in the market treatments, whereas in the individual treatment subjects may have perceived killing the mouse as a direct means to earn money. If this were the case, subjects may have found it more difficult to opt for killing in the individual treatment. We therefore ran another control treatment identical to the individual treatment but in which subjects could buy a lottery ticket for 2 euros. This renders it more likely that subjects perceive the mouse death as a side-effect of a buying decision. The lottery paid out either 10 or 15 euros, respectively, both with 50% probability. We chose an expected net value of 12.50 – 2 = 10.50 euros to compensate for possible risk aversion of subjects. If subjects bought the lottery ticket, a mouse got killed “as another consequence” of the buying decision, i.e., as a side-effect. Forty-three subjects participated in this additional control condition. Again, outcomes are very similar to those in the individual condition: 46.5% of subjects decided to buy the ticket accepting the killing of a mouse. This fraction is significantly different from fractions in both market conditions (bilateral market, P = 0.021, n = 79 and multilateral market, P = 0.003, n = 97, two-sample test of proportions). Unsurprisingly, the killing rate is not significantly different from the individual condition (P = 0.946, n = 167, two-sample test of proportions).

Third, let us comment on why we used the minimum trading price as our main dependent variable to assess a seller’s willingness to kill a mouse in markets [see also (16)]. Very likely, traders tried to negotiate higher prices than their reservation values to realize positive gains from trade. This should be the case for any market situation with information rents in which reservation values are private, as in our case. For example, a seller in the bilateral market with a reservation value of 5 euros is unlikely to actually trade at 5 euros. Instead, he should try to negotiate higher prices. We therefore think that concluded prices provide an upper bound for the sellers’ reservation values. One may also argue that using the minimum concluded price could bias results if sellers made mistakes, erroneously agreeing to trade at prices lower than they would have actually liked to accept. We believe that it is unlikely that traders made such mistakes, because trading involved a deliberate decision to either accept or make offers. Yet, accounting for this possibility, we also calculated median values of concluded trading prices below or equal to 10 euros. The corresponding killing fractions are 67% for the bilateral market and 76% for the multilateral market, very similar to the ones reported in Fig. 1. These fractions are statistically significantly different from the individual condition (P = 0.029 for bilateral market and P < 0.001 for multilateral market, two-sample test of proportions).

We stress another aspect of our results: following the methodological standards in experimental economic, it was essential to incentivize subjects’ decisions in the individual condition, i.e., subjects needed to receive money according to their decisions. Otherwise, a comparison with market outcomes would have been misleading. For subjects, it would be “cheap” to claim that they are moral if being moral costs nothing. The comparison of the individual treatment with markets did therefore not involve paying money versus not paying money. Yet, introducing a money prime may already lower moral standards, as several studies have pointed out. For example, it has been shown that material primes or labels reduce helpfulness or prosocial behavior and increase competitiveness (29–31) and that an economics background correlates with selfishness (32). Hence, the impact of markets on moral behavior may in general be even more pronounced than our study suggests.

We have shown that market interaction displays a tendency to lower moral values, relative to individually stated preferences. This phenomenon is pervasive. Many people express objections against child labor, other forms of exploitation of the workforce, detrimental conditions for animals in meat production, or environmental damage. At the same time, they seem to ignore their moral standards when acting as market participants, searching and buying the cheapest electronics, fashion, or food, and thereby consciously or subconsciously creating the undesired negative consequences to which they generally object. We have shown that this tendency is prevalent already in very simple bilateral trading where both market sides are fully pivotal in that if they refuse to trade, the mouse will stay alive. In markets with many buyers and sellers, diffusion of being pivotal for outcomes adds to moral decay. This “replacement” logic is a common feature of markets, and it is therefore not surprising that the rhetoric of traders often appeals to the phrase that “if I don’t buy or sell, someone else will.”

In the experiment, subjects were fully aware of the consequences of their decisions in that they could save the life of a mouse if they refused to accept a monetary amount. Our findings therefore suggest that appealing to morality has only a limited potential for alleviating negative market externalities. For example, anti–child-labor or environmental protection campaigns may not be that effective because markets for goods undermine the relevant social values. The results also suggest why societies do ban markets for certain “repugnant” activities (33). Historically, dispute about the marketability and the appropriateness of markets has led to some of the most fundamental upheavals within modern societies. For example, the abolishment of trading human beings was a major issue in the American Civil War. Martin Luther’s critique of the trade of indulgences, in which buyers and sellers exchanged money for the freedom from God’s punishment for sin, was a key element of the Protestant Reformation. Karl Marx’s idea that capital stock should not be tradable, that it must belong to the workers themselves, is a cornerstone of communist ideology. With the recent financial crisis, discussion has arisen about the appropriateness of markets for complex financial products like derivatives involving high risks. Stock traders have been criticized for riding bubbles and for cashing in short-term profits without thinking about possible negative long-term impacts on companies, as well as on society in general.

Markets have tremendous virtues in their capability to generate information about scarcity and to allocate resources efficiently. The point of this study is not to question market economies in general. Indeed, other organizational forms of allocation and price determination such as in totalitarian systems or command societies do not generically place higher value on moral outcomes (34). Furthermore, the development of a complex market structure may require and therefore correlate with the prevalence of moral and social values, such as trust and cooperativeness. Results confirming this intuition, in line with the Doux-commerce Thesis (35), are expressed, e.g., by Kenneth Arrow (36). However, focusing on the causal effects of institutions, we show that for a given population, markets erode moral values. We therefore agree with the statement quoted at the beginning that we as a society have to think about where markets are appropriate—and where they are not.

Supplementary Materials
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/340/6133/707/DC1
Supplementary Text
Figs. S1 and S2
Tables S1 and S2
References (40, 41)

References and Notes
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26.↵ Median and modal prices in the bilateral market are 10 euros. Of all trades, 80.7% were in the range of 9 to 11 euros. In the multilateral market, all prices were below or equal to 10 euros, with one exception of a price of 10.1 euros.
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34.R. E. Lane, The Market Experience (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1991).
35. Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Thomas Paine all expressed the view that markets and social behavior go hand in hand (Doux-commerce Thesis); see (38).
36.K. Arrow (39) points out that markets may require high levels of “professional ethics” (p. 36) to perform complex transactions under private information.
37.M. Spranca,  E. Minsk,  J. Baron, Omission and commission in judgment and choice, . J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 27, 76 (1991).
38.A. Hirschman, Rival interpretations of market society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble? J. Econ. Lit. 20, 1463 (1982).
39.K. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (Norton, New York and London, 1974).
40.B. Greiner, An online recruitment system for economic experiments: Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen. GWDG Bericht 63, Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, Göttingen, 79 (2003).
41.U. Fischbacher, z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp. Econ. 10, 171 (2007).
42.Acknowledgments: We thank F. Kosse and S. Walter for excellent research assistance. For technical, programming, or administrative support, we thank in particular M. Antony as well as T. Deckers, U. Fischbacher, H. Gerhardt, B. Jendrock, J. Radbruch, S. Schmid, and B. Vogt. We also thank J. Abeler, K. Albrecht, S. Altmann, J. Costard, T. Dohmen, M. Gabriel, S. Gächter, H.-M. von Gaudecker, J. von Hagen, D. Harsch, P. Heidhues, D. Huffman, S. Jäger, S. Kube, G. Loewenstein, C. May, A. Oswald, F. Rosar, N. Schweizer, A. Shaked, G. Wagner, M. Wibral, F. Zimmermann, and participants at various seminars for helpful comments. Finally, we thank all students, colleagues, and post-docs for helping to run the experiments. We acknowledge financial support by the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) through the Leibniz Program. Data reported in the paper are available at www.cens.uni-bonn.de/experiments/falk-szech/. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Bonn (reference no. 066/12).

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Letters The Systematic Place of Morals in Markets—Response Armin Falk, Nora Szech
Science Vol. 341  no. 6147  p. 714  16 August 2013. Christoph Luetge and  Hannes Rusch

Research Article Morals and Markets Armin Falk, Nora Szech
Science 10 May 2013:  707-711.

In their Research Article “Morals and markets” (10 May, p. 707), A. Falk and N. Szech gave participants a choice between saving the life of a mouse and receiving money. The value of the mouse’s life was higher when participants sold it directly to the experimenter than when they bargained over the price with other participants.

For the particular comparison they draw between selling a mouse’s life directly and bargaining for it, the findings mark a substantial advance in experimental economics and experimental moral philosophy. We do not believe, however, that the general claim that “markets erode moral values” (p. 710) can be justified by this observation. The real-world examples of “immoral markets” chosen by the authors—slave trade and the sale of indulgences—are extreme cases. It is easy to find counterexamples in which markets lead to moral improvements. For example, as Falk and Szech acknowledge, replacing potentially arbitrarily acting private or state authorities with markets can benefit all affected parties (1, 2) and is a direct moral improvement. More important, free markets can sometimes even create incentives for their participants to morally improve, such as by yielding lower returns to vendors who discriminate against certain groups of customers (3, 4).

The moral consequences of real markets, we think, are mostly determined by the regulatory framework in which those markets are embedded (5, 6). Falk and Szech’s conclusions reach too far in that they claim to discuss “the market” without taking into account that different markets, while using the same mechanism of supply and demand, are subject to quite distinct rules.

Finally, Falk and Szech’s design, ingenious as it is, is unable to answer the crucial question: Which institutional alternative to markets would cause less moral erosion? Therefore, their critique of the market mechanism does not lead to any constructive policy recommendation.

Christoph Luetge,
Hannes Rusch

References
1W. L. Megginson,  J. M. Netter, J. Econ. Lit. 39, 321 (2001).
2R. A. Posner, J. Pol. Econ. 83, 807 (1974).
3G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1971).
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4.O. Ashenfelter,  T. Hannan, Quart. J. Econ. 101, 149 (1986).
5.S. Storm,  C. W. M. Naastepad, Industrial Relations 48, 629 (2009).
6.M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965).
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— —
Science 16 August 2013:  Vol. 341  no. 6147  p. 714
•Letters
The Systematic Place of Morals in Markets—Response

In our Research Article, we ran a series of controlled laboratory experiments and report a causal effect of market institutions on moral transgression. Our findings contribute to the literature on the malleability of morality in general and the effects of institutions on moral transgression in particular.

As we argue in our Research Article, we do not aim at questioning market economies per se. Markets often improve social welfare for market participants in efficiently allocating goods (1). Competition in markets may also pressure firms to reduce discrimination against certain groups of workers or customers (2). Our research interest, however, was not to study effects of markets on active market participants but on third parties—i.e., those who are not directly involved in market trading, and who potentially suffer from trade. Our study shows that market interaction reduces how people value harm and damage done to third parties.

To study how markets affect moral outcomes, we implemented bilateral and multilateral markets, using the double auction institution. This is a well-established and widely used market set-up in economics, which displays the positive properties of allocation mentioned above (3). We deliberately abstained from imposing additional regulatory details, to allow for more general conclusions. As is standard in economics, these markets are real, with real participants and real incentives. Thus, we are convinced that the chosen market institution is well suited for the research questions at hand.

We agree that our findings raise the pressing question of how to design policies that mitigate the problem of moral erosion in markets. This, however, requires a thorough understanding of the relevant underlying mechanisms, as we discuss in our Research Article. First, markets generate information about selling and buying behavior and thus provide systematic social information about prevailing norms. Second, because trading involves at least two parties, market interactions allow traders to share guilt associated with immoral outcomes. Third, in markets with many buyers and sellers, the notion of being pivotal is diffused: Traders may apply a “replacement logic” (4), telling themselves that if they do not trade, some other trader may. These mechanisms potentially play a crucial role not only in markets but also in many nonmarket contexts. For example, in group decision-making, sharing of guilt and diffusion of pivotality may contribute to moral transgression. In recent work, we used the same mouse paradigm and found causal evidence that the diffusion of pivotality in groups erodes moral behavior compared with individual decision-making (5).

We hope that our study laid ground for thinking about moral consequences of market interaction and that it will stimulate research on relevant mechanisms.

Armin Falk,  Nora Szech

Science 10 May 2013:  Vol. 340  no. 6133  pp. 707-711

References
1.K. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Welfare Economics (Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1951).   Search Google Scholar
2.G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1971).
Search Google Scholar
3.C. R. Plott,  V. L. Smith, Eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2008), vol. 1.    Search Google Scholar
4.J. Sobel, Markets and Other-Regarding Preferences (Discussion Paper, Economics Department, Univ. of California, San Diego, CA, 2010).    Search Google Scholar
5.A. Falk,  N. Szech, Organizations, Diffused Pivotality, and Immoral Outcomes (Discussion Paper, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2013).    Search Google Scholar

January 22, 2014 Ideas From a Manger

By Ross Douthat                                               Ideas From a Manger                                                  Click here for a pdf version

PAUSE for a moment, in the last leg of your holiday shopping, to glance at one of the manger scenes you pass along the way. Cast your eyes across the shepherds and animals, the infant and the kings. Then try to see the scene this way: not just as a pious set-piece, but as a complete world picture — intimate, miniature and comprehensive.

Because that’s what the Christmas story really is — an entire worldview in a compact narrative, a depiction of how human beings relate to the universe and to one another. It’s about the vertical link between God and man — the angels, the star, the creator stooping to enter his creation. But it’s also about the horizontal relationships of society, because it locates transcendence in the ordinary, the commonplace, the low.

It’s easy in our own democratic era to forget how revolutionary the latter idea was. But the biblical narrative, the great critic Erich Auerbach wrote, depicted “something which neither the poets nor the historians of antiquity ever set out to portray: the birth of a spiritual movement in the depths of the common people, from within the everyday occurrences of contemporary life.”

And because that egalitarian idea is so powerful today, one useful — and seasonally appropriate — way to look at our divided culture’s competing worldviews is to see what each one takes from the crèche in Bethlehem.

Many Americans still take everything: They accept the New Testament as factual, believe God came in the flesh, and endorse the creeds that explain how and why that happened. And then alongside traditional Christians, there are observant Jews and Muslims who believe the same God revealed himself directly in some other historical and binding form.

But this biblical world picture is increasingly losing market share to what you might call the spiritual world picture, which keeps the theological outlines suggested by the manger scene — the divine is active in human affairs, every person is precious in God’s sight — but doesn’t sweat the details.

This is the world picture that red-staters get from Joel Osteen, blue-staters from Oprah, and everybody gets from our “God bless America” civic religion. It’s Christian-ish but syncretistic; adaptable, easygoing and egalitarian. It doesn’t care whether the angel really appeared to Mary: the important thing is that a spiritual version of that visitation could happen to anyone — including you.

Then, finally, there’s the secular world picture, relatively rare among the general public but dominant within the intelligentsia. This worldview keeps the horizontal message of the Christmas story but eliminates the vertical entirely. The stars and angels disappear: There is no God, no miracles, no incarnation. But the egalitarian message — the common person as the center of creation’s drama — remains intact, and with it the doctrines of liberty, fraternity and human rights.

As these world pictures jostle and compete, their strengths and weaknesses emerge. The biblical picture has the weight of tradition going for it, the glory of centuries of Western art, the richness of millenniums’ worth of theological speculation. But its specificity creates specific problems: how to remain loyal to biblical ethics in a commercial, sexually liberated society.

The spiritual picture lacks the biblical picture’s resources and rigor, but it makes up for them in flexibility. A doctrine challenged by science can be abandoned; a commandment that clashes with modern attitudes ignored; the problem of evil washed away in a New Age bath.

The secular picture, meanwhile, seems to have the rigor of the scientific method behind it. But it actually suffers from a deeper intellectual incoherence than either of its rivals, because its cosmology does not harmonize at all with its moral picture.

In essence, it proposes a purely physical and purposeless universe, inhabited by evolutionary accidents whose sense of self is probably illusory. And yet it then continues to insist on moral and political absolutes with all the vigor of a 17th-century New England preacher. And the rope bridges flung across this chasm — the scientific-sounding logic of utilitarianism, the Darwinian justifications for altruism — tend to waft, gently, into a logical abyss.

So there are two interesting religious questions that will probably face Americans for many Christmases to come. The first is whether biblical religion can regain some of the ground it has lost, or whether the spiritual worldview will continue to carry all before it.

The second is whether the intelligentsia’s fusion of scientific materialism and liberal egalitarianism — the crèche without the star, the shepherds’ importance without the angels’ blessing — will eventually crack up and give way to something new.

The cracks are visible, in philosophy and science alike. But the alternative is not. One can imagine possibilities: a deist revival or a pantheist turn, a new respect for biblical religion, a rebirth of the 20th century’s utopianism and will-to-power cruelty.

But for now, though a few intellectuals scan the heavens, they have yet to find their star. — ————–

Richard Luettgen New Jersey

The reality of human interaction is a very complex set of obligations existing in all directions. An individual has obligations, legal as well as ethical, to spouses, children, friends and acquaintances, to employers, to society at large; and in turn expects that others respect the same obligations owed him, as an individual or as part of a greater community.

But that network of interdependency starts and stops with humans. Any connection to deity is one that is overlaid onto an existing network that has been around, growing ever more complex, since BEFORE we came out of the trees (between 5,700 and 10,000 years ago, according to some). It’s a construct of either faith born of need or simply of our imaginations. It may be true, but … it may not.

When I see a manger scene, despite having grown up in a VERY Christian home, I wonder how off-putting it is to Jews, Muslims and the workaday agnostic or even atheist — Americans all, embedded as they are in their own workaday networks of very human interdependencies.

I spent a lot of time arguing, when young, with Jesuits who professed that the source of all morality was religion — and, not coincidentally, theirs. Always seemed like a self-serving argument. To me, the source of morality isn’t religion, or manger as symbol, but an awareness and acceptance of that network of very human interdependency, as the primary premise justifying civilization.

All that said, a very Merry Christmas to many, and a happy holiday to all. Iconoclast1956 Columbus, OH

I find this column rather inscrutable. Ross seems to be suggesting that the equality of the human race derives from the Christmas story. That doesn’t sound right to me. Rather, I believe the democratic ethos derives from many thinkers and writers acting over a long period of time. Ross also seems to have overlooked that Jesus advised slaves to obey their masters, per the New Testament. That doesn’t jibe with an “all people are equal” ethos well.

My agnosticism derives mainly two sources: doubts about the accuracy and credibility of events that supposedly happened two thousand years ago or more, as recorded in the Bible; and the excellent track record of science vis-a-vis religion in explaining the universe. Leonard Mlodinow said, in so many words, that astrophysicists can now explain that it’s possible for the universe to have originated from nothing. Under such circumstances, it’s hard for me to believe there is any meaning at all in the Christmas story.

Carl Sollee Atlanta

A fascinating Christmas meditation. Douthat does a great job describing these spiritual or secular types. I have friends that fit into each. As Pope Francis and the Dalai Lama argue, in their different styles and words, the ideological differences Douthat points to can be at least partially bridged by pursuing the “good” together: Helping the poor and downtrodden, the old and lonely, the young and vulnerable, practicing courtesy and ethics in our lives, a race to virtues if you will, is the best way to bridge the ideological differences among these spiritual and philosophic types. Too many of us, whether we are nominally atheist or religious (or spiritual but not religious) are simply too hedonistic. We can better!

George Kvidera Cudahy, WI

I’d like to make 2 points:

1) The “Darwinian justifications for altruism,” as I recall from what Darwin wrote in one of his letters, probably stem from when early humans looked upon other human beings and realized that they were all pretty much the same. Buddha echoed this sentiment when he said – “If you see yourself in others, then what harm can you do?” Jesus essentially said the same thing and added that to “love your neighbor as yourself” is to love God. Anyway, it’s a simple and natural concept that most everyone believes in.

2) One doesn’t have to view the Christmas story as an historical event to feel its power. There’s a line from “O Little Town of Bethlehem” that always gets me: “The hopes and fears of all the years are met in thee tonight.” I know it’s meant to apply to the birth of Christ, but I can’t help but feel that it’s true for every child born into the world. We fear for them, but there’s always hope that they will make the world a better place than we did.

— —
New Republic 12-26-13
Ross Douthat Is On Another Erroneous Rampage Against Secularism BY JERRY A. COYNE

Are there any conservative columnists who aren’t either wooly-brained, filled with unrighteous anger, or both? Even George Will occasionally got it right, but Ross Douthat? Nope. And he writes for The New York Times, the best newspaper in America. Can’t they do better? I would actually want to read a good conservative columnist, for it’s bad to become complacent and it’s salubrious to have your views challenged. But Douthat isn’t a contender.

Take his column from December 21, “Ideas from a manger.” The theme is Douthat’s musings on the religiosity of America, inspired, of course, by the Christmas season. While gazing at a manger scene, his heart racing as he sees the baby Jesus, Douthat gets an idea: American religious worldviews fall into three categories, one of which is deeply problematic (guess which one!). I’ll list the categories and show what he finds dubious about each (Douthat’s words are indented).

1. Biblical literalism.

The view:

Many Americans still take everything: They accept the New Testament as factual, believe God came in the flesh, and endorse the creeds that explain how and why that happened. And then alongside traditional Christians, there are observant Jews and Muslims who believe the same God revealed himself directly in some other historical and binding form.

The same God? You mean the one that sends Christians and Jews to hell if he’s Allah, and Muslims to hell if he’s the Christian God? How can that be the same God?

Douthat’s problem:

The biblical picture has the weight of tradition going for it, the glory of centuries of Western art, the richness of millenniums’ worth of theological speculation. But its specificity creates specific problems: how to remain loyal to biblical ethics in a commercial, sexually liberated society.

Really? The problem is how to keep being a fundamentalist in a “commercial, sexually liberated society?” Curious that Douthat doesn’t mention that literalism is also insupportably

wrong. Curious, too, that Douthat doesn’t mention the disparities between adherents of “the same God” who for some reason find their dogmas in irresolvable conflict.

2. The “spiritual” take. The view:

But this biblical world picture is increasingly losing market share to what you might call the spiritual world picture, which keeps the theological outlines suggested by the manger scene— the divine is active in human affairs, every person is precious in God’s sight—but doesn’t sweat the details.

This is the world picture that red-staters get from Joel Osteen, blue-staters from Oprah, and everybody gets from our ‘God bless America’ civic religion. It’s Christian-ish but syncretistic; adaptable, easygoing and egalitarian. It doesn’t care whether the angel really appeared to Mary: the important thing is that a spiritual version of that visitation could happen to anyone —including you.

I’m curious what the “spiritual version” of a visitation from an angel really is. Douthat’s problem:

The spiritual picture lacks the biblical picture’s resources and rigor, but it makes up for them in flexibility. A doctrine challenged by science can be abandoned; a commandment that clashes with modern attitudes ignored; the problem of evil washed away in a New Age bath.

One senses that Douthat doesn’t really like this point of view: the “New Age bath” seems pejorative. If I were to guess, I’d put his own view somewhere between #1 and #2. But what really irks him is #3:

3. The secular view. The view:

Then, finally, there’s the secular world picture, relatively rare among the general public but dominant within the intelligentsia. This worldview keeps the horizontal message of the Christmas story but eliminates the vertical entirely. The stars and angels disappear: There is no God, no miracles, no incarnation. But the egalitarian message—the common person as the center of creation’s drama—remains intact, and with it the doctrines of liberty, fraternity and human rights.

Well, that doesn’t sound too bad, save for the idea that atheism is dominant within the “intelligentsia” (it’s not, even among scientists), and secularists’ supposed view that “the common person is the center of creation’s drama,” which isn’t true, either. If there is any “drama” in creation, most of it does not involve people at all. There’s the Big Bang, all those other galaxies, black holes, exploding stars, and, on our planet, evolution, on whose branching bush we are but one tiny twig. Nevertheless, Douthat hates secularism:

Douthat’s problem:

“The secular picture, meanwhile, seems to have the rigor of the scientific method behind it. But it actually suffers from a deeper intellectual incoherence than either of its rivals, because its cosmology does not harmonize at all with its moral picture.

In essence, it proposes a purely physical and purposeless universe, inhabited by evolutionary accidents whose sense of self is probably illusory. And yet it then continues to insist on moral and political absolutes with all the vigor of a 17th-century New England preacher. And the rope bridges flung across this chasm—the scientific-sounding logic of utilitarianism, the Darwinian justifications for altruism—tend to waft, gently, into a logical abyss.

First, I’m not sure what Douthat means when he says “cosmology does not harmonize at all” with the moral picture of secularism. Cosmology doesn’t give one iota of evidence for a purpose (it could!) or for God. Most of the universe is cold, bleak, airless, and uninhabitable. In fact, such a cosmology harmonizes far better with a secular moral picture than a religious one. Secularists see a universe without apparent purpose and realize that we must forge our own purposes and ethics, not derive them from a God for which there’s no evidence.

Yes, secularism does propose a physical and purposeless universe, and many (but not all) of us accept the notion that our sense of self is a neuronal illusion. But although the universe is purposeless, our lives aren’t. This conflation of a purposeless universe (i.e., one not created by a transcendent being for a specific reason) with purposeless human lives is a trick that the faithful use to make atheism seem dark and nihilistic. But we make our own purposes, and they’re real. Right now my purpose is to write this piece, and then I’ll work on a book I’m writing, and later I’ll have dinner with a friend. Soon I’ll go to Poland to visit more friends. Maybe later I’ll read a nice book and learn something. Soon I’ll be teaching biology to graduate students. Those are real purposes, not the illusory purposes to which Douthat wants us to devote our only lifeNor do all atheists insist on moral and political absolutes. Most of the savvy ones, at least, approach their politics and ethics, like we approach our science, provisionally. Take ethics. Sam Harris, an atheist, wrote a book proposing a scientific view of ethics that, he said, was objective. Many atheists didn’t agree, and the arguments went back and forth. Is it okay to torture people if there’s a possibility to saves lives by doing so? Is it ever ethical to lie? It is atheists who argue most often about such things, for religiously-based ethics is either fixed or malleable only by the hammer of secularism. Secularists like Harris and Peter Singer argue about what’s right and wrong using reason, while Christians like William Lane Craig are the Biblical absolutists.

But the worst part is Douthat’s characterization of the effects of secularism:

… the rope bridges flung across this chasm — the scientific-sounding logic of utilitarianism, the Darwinian justifications for altruism — tend to waft, gently, into a logical abyss.

Talk about rope bridges! What is Christianity but a giant rope bridge flung across the Chasm of Hope? And we see nothing on the other side.

Utilitarianism may not be a perfect ethical system, but what, pray tell, is Douthat’s? If it’s Biblical, does he give away all his possessions and abandon his family to follow Jesus, as the Bible commands? Does he think that those who gather sticks on the Sabbath, curse their

parents, or commit adultery should be killed? If not, why not? It’s what the Bible says! If he doesn’t believe in that kind of morality, then he’s adhering to a secular, extra-Biblical view of ethics, which he then must justify.

As for where altruism comes from, who knows? My own suspicions are that it’s partly genetic and partly cultural, but what’s important is that we feel it and can justify it. I can justify it on several grounds, including that altruism makes for a more harmonious society, helps those in need, and, as a selfish motive, that being altruistic gains you more respect. None of this justification has anything to do with God.

I have run on too long, but I want to show Douthat’s penultimate paragraphs, which are even more misleading:

The second [religious question] is whether the intelligentsia’s fusion of scientific materialism and liberal egalitarianism—the crèche without the star, the shepherds’ importance without the angels’ blessing—will eventually crack up and give way to something new.

The cracks are visible, in philosophy and science alike. But the alternative is not. One can imagine possibilities: a deist revival or a pantheist turn, a new respect for biblical religion, a rebirth of the 20th century’s utopianism and will-to-power cruelty.

Check out those two links. The first is to Thomas Nagel’s book Mind and Cosmos, which decries evolution as insufficient to explain life’s diversity and posits, without any evidence, some non-Goddy but teleological force driving the process. It’s a bad book and has been roundly trounced by Nagel’s fellow philosophers (see here, for instance). It’s not a crack, but a crackpot book.

The second link is to a nice article by Steven Weinberg in the New York Review of Books, “Physics: what we do and don’t know.” It’s a succinct summary of the state of the art of both cosmology and particle physics, highlighting the mysteries that beset those fields, including dark matter, dark energy, string theory, how to unify gravity with the other fundamental forces, and whether there might be multiple universes. We don’t know the answers, but what is science without unsolved problems?

And it’s those unsolved problems that Douthat sees as “cracks.” Presumably 200 years ago he would have seen cracks in the unexplained “designlike” features of organisms, in the origin of the universe, and in the unknown constituents of matter. These “cracks” have now been filled. In the unanswered questions that remain, Douthat sees gaps that, he thinks, can be filled only with God. But it’s always been a losing strategy to argue that scientific puzzles presage the death of naturalism and the arrival of Jesus.

Douthat is wrong. The cracks are not in the edifice of secularism, but in the temples of faith. As he should know if he reads his own newspaper, secularism is not cracking up but growing in the U.S. He and his fellow religionists are on the way out, and his columns are his swan song. It may take years, but one fine day our grandchildren will look back on people like Douthat, shake their heads, and wonder why some people couldn’t put away their childish things.

Jerry A. Coyne is a Professor of Ecology and Evolution at The University of Chicago and author of Why Evolution is True, as well as the eponymous website. A version of this post first appeared on WhyEvolutionIsTrue.

——
January 6, 2014, NYTimes Website

The Confidence of Jerry Coyne Ross Douthat

One of the problems with belonging to a faction that’s convinced it’s on the winning side of intellectual history is that it becomes easy to persuade oneself that one’s own worldview has no weak points whatsoever, no internal contradictions or ragged edges, no cracks through which a critic’s wedge could end up driven. This kind of overconfidence has been displayed, at various points in the human story, by everyone from millenarians to Marxists, inquisitors to eugenicists. But right now its vices are often found in a certain type of atheistic polemicist, and in a style of anti-religious argument that’s characterized by a peculiar, almost-willed ignorance of why reasonable people might doubt the scientific-materialist worldview.

A case in point: The University of Chicago professor Jerry Coyne’s response, republished by The New Republic, to my Christmas column on the various modern American world-pictures and what each one owes to the scene in Bethlehem. That column took a concluding dig at secular naturalism, for which Coyne is a prominent evangelist, suggesting that its view of the cosmos — a purposeless, purely physical universe, in which human life is accidental, human history directionless, and human consciousness probably an illusion — is at odds with its general political and moral posture (liberal, egalitarian, right-based, progressive) in ways that make the entire world-picture ripe for reassessment or renovation. So it’s entirely fair that Coyne took the opportunity to deliver some body blows to theism and Christianity in return.

What’s striking about his response, though, is the extent to which its own account of the secular, materialist world-picture actually illustrates precisely the problems and tensions that I was talking about, in ways that even a casual reader should find obvious but which Coyne apparently did not. He can see the weak points in a religious argument, but the weaknesses of his own side of the debate are sufficiently invisible to him that his rebuttal flirts with self- caricature.

Let me offer two examples. First, to the idea that the materialist’s purposeless cosmos poses some problems for the liberal view (or any view) of moral and political purpose in human affairs, Coyne responds:

I’m not sure what Douthat means when he says “cosmology does not harmonize at all” with the moral picture of secularism. Cosmology doesn’t give one iota of evidence for a purpose (it could!) or for God. Most of the universe is cold, bleak, airless, and uninhabitable. In fact, such a cosmology harmonizes far better with a secular moral picture than a religious one.

Secularists see a universe without apparent purpose and realize that we must forge our own purposes and ethics, not derive them from a God for which there’s no evidence.

Yes, secularism does propose a physical and purposeless universe, and many (but not all) of us accept the notion that our sense of self is a neuronal illusion. But although the universe is purposeless, our lives aren’t. This conflation of a purposeless universe (i.e., one not created by a transcendent being for a specific reason) with purposeless human lives is a trick that the faithful use to make atheism seem dark and nihilistic. But we make our own purposes, and they’re real. Right now my purpose is to write this piece, and then I’ll work on a book I’m writing, and later I’ll have dinner with a friend. Soon I’ll go to Poland to visit more friends. Maybe later I’ll read a nice book and learn something. Soon I’ll be teaching biology to graduate students. Those are real purposes, not the illusory purposes to which Douthat wants us to devote our only life.

So Coyne’s vision for humanity here is heroic, promethean, quasi-existentialist: Precisely because the cosmos has no architect or plan or underlying purpose, we are free to “forge” our own purposes, to “make” meaning for ourselves, to create an ethics worthy of a free species, to seize responsibility for our own lives and codes and goals rather than punting the issue to some imaginary skygod. (Ayn Rand could not have put it better.) And these self- created purposes have the great advantage of being really, truly real, whereas the purposes suggested by religion are by definition “illusory.”

Well and good. But then halfway through this peroration, we have as an aside the confession that yes, okay, it’s quite possible given materialist premises that “our sense of self is a neuronal illusion.” At which point the entire edifice suddenly looks terribly wobbly — because who, exactly, is doing all of this forging and shaping and purpose-creating if Jerry Coyne, as I understand him (and I assume he understands himself) quite possibly does not actually exist at all? The theme of his argument is the crucial importance of human agency under eliminative materialism, but if under materialist premises the actual agent is quite possibly a fiction, then who exactly is this I who “reads” and “learns” and “teaches,” and why in the universe’s name should my illusory self believe Coyne’s bold proclamation that his illusory self’s purposes are somehow “real” and worthy of devotion and pursuit? (Let alone that they’re morally significant: But more on that below.) Prometheus cannot be at once unbound and unreal; the human will cannot be simultaneously triumphant and imaginary.

It’s true that even if the conscious self is an illusion, human beings would still have purposes in the sense that any organism has purposes, and our movements — all that travel and reading and dining, in Coyne’s case — wouldn’t just be random or indeterminate. But just as nobody would describe a tree growing toward the sun or a bee returning to the hive as “forging their own purposes” in life, so too Coyne’s promethean language about human agency implies a much higher conception of what a human being IS — both in terms of the reality of consciousness and the freedom afforded to it — than his world-picture will allow.

Obviously the foregoing is not the end of the argument: There are many talented philosophers who have spent their careers trying to iron out this particular kink in the eliminative- materialist fabric, or explaining why it’s not actually a major kink at all, and there’s no

reason why you should take a newspaper columnist’s side against their formidable qualifications. But the point is that if you’re going to argue about this, with a newspaper columnist or anyone, you have to actually make the argument; you can’t just blithely assert what looks like contradiction and claim to be defending science and reason against the obscurantism of religion. Or rather, you can – but you won’t make your side look particularly good.

Then further down, here’s Coyne on the morals of a materialist:

As for where altruism comes from, who knows? My own suspicions are that it’s partly genetic and partly cultural, but what’s important is that we feel it and can justify it. I can justify it on several grounds, including that altruism makes for a more harmonious society, helps those in need, and, as a selfish motive, that being altruistic gains you more respect. None of this justification has anything to do with God.

Again, if this is the scientific-materialist’s justification for morality, then the worldview has even more problems than I suggested. Coyne proposes three arguments in favor of a cosmopolitan altruism, two of which are circular: Making a “harmonious society” and helping “those in need” are reasons for altruism that presuppose a certain view of the moral law, in which charity and harmony are considered worthwhile and important goals. (If my question is, “what’s the justification for your rights-based egalitarianism?” saying “because it’s egalitarian!” is not much of an answer.)

The third at least seems to have some kind of Darwinian-ish, quasi-scientific logic, but among other difficulties it’s an argument that only holds so long as the altruistic choice comes at a relatively low cost: If you’re a white Southerner debating whether to speak out against a lynching party or a Dutch family contemplating whether to hide your Jewish neighbors from the SS, the respect factor isn’t really in play — as, indeed, it rarely is in any moral dilemma worthy of the name. (And of course, depending on your ideas about harmony and stability, Coyne’s “harmonious society” argument might also seem like a case against opposing Jim Crow or anti-Semitism — because why rock the boat on behalf of a persecuted minority when stability and order are the greater goods?)

The point that critics make against eliminative-materialism, which Coyne seems not to grasp, is that it makes a kind of hard-and-fast moral realism logically impossible — because if the only real thing is matter in motion, and the only legitimate method of discernment the scientific method, you’ll never get to an absolute “thou shalt not murder” (or “thou shalt risk your life on behalf of your Jewish neighbor”) now matter how cleverly you think and argue. This is not necessarily a theistic objection — it’s one of the issues raised in Thomas Nagel’s controversy-generating book, which explicitly keeps religious ideas at arm’s length — and for that matter there are forms of theism that need not imply moral realism, and Euthyphro-style objections to the union of the two. But I don’t think those of us who still embrace the traditional Western idea of God are crazy to suggest that our cosmology has at least a surface compatibility with moral realism that the materialist conception of the universe’s (nonexistent) purposes seems to lack.

So if you’re going to defend both materialism and modern rights-based liberalism, you have to actually address this point head-on. Make a case for a more limited, non-metaphysical form of

moral realism, make a more thoroughgoing attempt to discern some sort of moral teleology in the Darwinian story (though of course Coyne has denounced efforts along these lines as “creationism for liberals”), go full relativist and make a purely aesthetic case for cosmopolitanism, I don’t care what — but give me something that doesn’t either beg the question (“we should help people because it helps people!”) or pretend that there are actually solid selfish reasons for the most costly, heroic, and plainly self-sacrificial forms of non-self-interested behavior.

Finally, I enjoyed Coyne’s parting sally:

Douthat is wrong. The cracks are not in the edifice of secularism, but in the temples of faith. As he should know if he reads his own newspaper, secularism is not cracking up but growing in the U.S. He and his fellow religionists are on the way out, and his columns are his swan song. It may take years, but one fine day our grandchildren will look back on people like Douthat, shake their heads, and wonder why some people couldn’t put away their childish things.

For a man who believes in “a physical and purposeless universe” with no room for teleology, Coyne seems remarkably confident about what direction human history is going in, and where it will end up. For my part, I don’t make any pretense to know what ideas will be au courant a hundred years from now, and as I said in the column, I think there are all kinds of worldviews that could gain ground — at the expense of my own Catholicism and secular materialism alike. (Right now, the territory around pantheism and panpsychism seems ripe for further population, but that’s just a guess.) But I suppose it’s a testament to my own childish faith in the “neuronal illusion” that is the human intellect that I can’t imagine a permanent intellectual victory for a worldview as ill-served by its popularizers as atheism is by Jerry Coyne.

— —

gemli Boston

I have blind spots that will forever prevent me from understanding things at which others excel, but I do have a natural aptitude for the sciences, and evolution is one of the things that I understand. While I will never write with the breadth and depth of a Ross Douthat, I’m convinced that he will never be able to understand what evolution is, how it created the diversity of life from inanimate materials, and how a bunch of neurons could create our sense of self.

I can imagine a group of people who have been isolated from all technology suddenly encountering a tape recorder, and hearing the recorded voice of their dead leader. Should we entertain their likely argument that the spirit of the person is inside the machine? No matter how smart and resourceful they are, they would simply be wrong. This is why it’s impossible to construct any secular argument that would convince Mr. Douthat. It’s not a question of intelligence, but of a blind spot that he’s not aware he has.

Coyne makes perfect sense to me. Morality evolved because those behaviors favored reproduction of our species. Our brains are large neural networks that cause us to think and

feel. Even very simple neural networks that you can build with parts from Radio Shack can behave in ways that defy understanding. Only someone unfamiliar with the science could claim that a supernatural explanation was required. There is none so blind as those who will not see.

John Hartford

“This kind of overconfidence has been displayed, at various points in the human story, by everyone from millenarians to Marxists, inquisitors to eugenicists.”

Not to mention conservatives and members of the Republican party? Although not a believer in the supernatural, as apparently Douhat is, I have no problem in co-existing with or even admiring and enjoying aspects such beliefs. Singing some of those wonderful Episcopalian hymns is not very different from enjoying the odd pagan survivals like kissing under the mistletoe. Hence I’m not particularly supportive of aggressive atheism any more than I’m supportive of aggressive Catholicism or Islam. That said it’s hard to argue that philosophically Coyne doesn’t have the better case. Many if not most participants in organized religion do so for tribalistic reasons and religion remains what it has always been a source of strife from unrest in the middle east to genocide in the Balkans. And in this country we’re seeing militant religious fundamentalists of one denomination or another attempting to impose their views on others or even infiltrate the political system. The founding fathers of this country who were almost all atheists or agnostics (whatever the social climate at the time compelled them to say) and recognized that religion was fundamentally divisive. They thus ensured it was excluded from the political system. It needs to stay that way.

James Wilson Colorado

Find a parent whose child is in serious trouble and you will see the driving force. God did not teach that parent to strive with every ounce of their being to help their child. That does not come from any commandment nor can it be learned or taught. The parent can not predict their behavior until they experience the situation. It is a trivial example of the life force that we do not control and did not invent. Darwinism does not pretend to explain the origin of that life force, but it does a decent job of describing its impact on the organisms and ecosystems of our world. Nobody we know created this universe. We will die without knowing its extent, but we will do everything we can to see that our offspring thrive.

Many enthusiasts for ultimate explanations cheerfully kill and destroy everything that stands opposed to their Church or Party. Better to be uncertain about the meaning of it all than to savage the planet and its inhabitants in the name of a religion or an ideology. The last century teaches us that ideology is wrong, not that the wrong ideas must be killed.

Keeping their fingers off the button should be our first agenda item. Getting rid of the button should be our second. We are unimaginably fortunate to exist at all. And given the failings of or species, there is no reason to believe we will survive the ideologues and religionists who control nuclear weapons and carbon emissions. But we can do small fixes and bungle through, one day at a time.

Richard Bozeman

Douthat, for all his intelligence and writing acumen, tends to make political and emotional arguments. Douthat gleefully leaps on Coyne’s acknowledgment that perhaps “our sense of self is a neuronal illusion”, declaring “the entire edifice suddenly looks terribly wobbly — because … Jerry Coyne, as I understand him … quite possibly does not actually exist at all” Here is the rub. Even if our sense of self is an illusion (and I believe this), it does NOT imply that the entity “Jerry Coyne” is an illusion! Nor does it imply that this debate is an illusion. Coyne is honest enough to even doubt his own beliefs. Douthat has a profound emotional need for a supernatural and impossible cosmos.

Matt S NYC

I’m sorry, but I have to laugh at Douthat’s arguments that empathy and altruism come from a magic god rather than from naturally selected processes which advance life and species. Look at the history of living organisms for such evidence.

The first cell could “eat,” could grow, could replicate, had little use for other cells. Indeed, other cells were competition for resources. However, cells that did work together found more efficient and effective ways of using resources, or surviving when conditions changed or resources grew scarce. They formed colonies, and in time these colonies led to multicellular life forms. Nature had selected cooperation.

And it continued to do so. Living things that worked in concert tended to survive and thrive, while those that didn’t often fell below on the evolutionary scale, and at times died out.

Look at the neanderthals. They had more powerful bodies and even larger brains (though they may not have translated to greater brainpower). And yet we survived because of our communal sense. Humans made advancements and taught those advancements to other humans, spreading that advantage quickly. Neanderthals, like our other primate cousins, evidence suggest did not.

Eduardo Los Angeles

This is an area of human endeavor that becomes so overcomplicated that the obvious is simply missed. We are ill-equipped to recognize and comprehend how long life has had to develop and evolve, and how that very process self-generates purpose — but not purpose in the goal-setting mentality of human thought and emotion.

Survival and reproduction are the most fundamental assets necessary to have the long-term prospect of greater complexity. But complexity is not a purpose or a goal. There is no designer, no greater power, no omniscient deity. Mice have the same will to live (survive) that humans do, but not the means to contemplate what that means or why it exists.

Humans assume that having this ability means there are answers, but that’s just an assumption. Superstition and mysticism, and then religion, exist only to answer questions that have no “answers.” The only answer is that life is about living, and to do this, survival is essential, which includes reproduction. Too simple and obvious, perhaps.

Religion is less about functional answers than about social control and the human penchant for power and wealth. Having “answers” includes rules and obedience that foster and sustain that penchant.

So, really, despite all the efforts to deduce the purpose of life and its persistence, they are all human fabrications. Thus, it’s easily just as plausible that the meaning of life truly is 42.

Eclectic Pragmatist — http://eclectic-pragmatist.tumblr.com/ John F. McBride Seattle

Why is this argument always presented in emotionally laden language chosen by two sides who don’t appear to even understand that fact, let alone escape it?

What, or who, is “God” Ross or Jerry? Unless you know of some way of getting out of your heads that “being” or “state of existence” without traditional language, to which you attribute the name ‘god’ and then proceed to vest belief in, or denial of ‘it,’ this discussion is immediately pointless.

I’ve been reading a collection of biblical scholars’ essays regarding the Dead Sea Scrolls. Among the impressions I’ve formed is how “formless” ‘God’ in this. Individuals use that name as if it means what it meant to individuals in the time that the Mishna was put down on scrolls with no way of knowing that.

All that can intellectually honestly be asserted, regardless of the amount of reading and consideration done is that there is may be function outside self and society and that individually or collectively there’s no success in quite describing it in language, or science.

Why Christianity? Why not Budhism or Hinduism or Judaism?

Mr. Coyne is disingenuous, too, since he apparently is aware of the puzzle that Uncertainty poses with its spooky science and yet asserts absolutely “there is no ‘god.’

The arguments here are intellectually pretty but neither strikes me as seeking to achieve what amounts to “a proof” let alone a paradigm shift. I suggest you get together, share a beer and start with a clean sheet of paper.

gemli Boston @John F. McBride,

Thanks for the reply. There may indeed be something going on behind these processes. After all, our whole conception of the universe changed in the 20th century. Mysteries still abound, but everything we know today was once a mystery. The scientific method that looks closely and systematically at the world did a far better job than religions did at finding not only the answers to many of those mysteries, but in revealing new mysteries that we were unaware of. Asking the right questions is as important as finding the right answers.

It’s not that science has all the answers, but that religions make many claims about the world that are either not true, or are impossible to verify. If god both is and is not, what are we to

do with that? Coyne says that we can get a reasonable explanation of the universe and our place within it without invoking a god: life can arise from non-living things, evolution explains how complexity emerges from simplicity, and complex neural nets can think and feel.

Douthat says there’s something more. Well of course there’s something more. But that something is very unlikely to be superstition and magic that only appears in ancient texts, that can’t be verified, and that is wrong whenever it makes a definite claim. If language limits what we say, imagine how much more limiting it is when we’re speaking in tongues!

serban Miller Place

The question that Douthat should think about is whether God is necessary to justify moral precepts. Or to be more precise, do humans need a God to justify their actions? I fail to see what difference it makes what the existence or non-existence of a real as opposed to an imagined God makes to our every day existence and to our behavior. Most people, whether religious or not, do not even know what it is that they mean by God, any attempt at definition inevitably ends up with some vague nebulous entity. Furthermore why would such entity care whether we believe or not in its existence? To me the most preposterous believers are those who survive some catastrophe that killed thousands and thank God for sparing them.

Matt S NYC

I don’t find Coyne’s view of the direction of history so silly. Take for example the fact that we once asserted (and some gullibly believed) that God selected all monarchs, and thus their rule was always just thanks to God. We certainly don’t govern that way now. Would Douthat assert that Obama was appointed by god, that god guided the vote in his infinite wisdom?

What of trial by combat? Would Douthat have us try George Zimmerman by pitting him against an African American marksman? Why the trouble and expense of evidence-based trials when we could let God choose the victor and dispense justice, as was done in the past?

Icon Chicago

Douthat clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding of the scientific evidence. This piece is full of obtuse misinterpretation. He desperately stumbles over the neuroscience, setting up a straw man of his own misconceptions, fails to grasp basic regression and gleefully jumps on perceived claims that he feels he can refute with logically flawed argument. I am sad that I read this piece and that the Times printed it. Not understanding reality is not proof for the existence of pink unicorns, but Douthat claims on his own faith that it is, and there is no working around such nonsense.

Jan. 8, 2014 at 6:16 p.m. Reply
Koyote The Great Plains

I’m not really interested in these wordy dissections. Got enough of that in grad school.

There is scant physical evidence to support theism, and overwhelming evidence to support the scientific (biology, chemistry, astronomy) view of the world and cosmos. Given that most religious believers think all other religions (other than their own) are wrong, and given that all religions require belief in essentially the same supernatural phenomena, theists are inconsistent – religion boils down to a choice to believe in one crazy narrative over other crazy narratives.

John F. McBride Seattle

I admire the way you’ve put this Gemli. Your argument makes sense to me, including for me by extrapolation the extension of guantum behaviors to nearly a physical level.

But intellectually I can’t completely rule out a “something” going on in all of these processes, even if I’m completely able to conclude as mistaken what ancient humanity, for instance Judaism and then Christianity, described in what is traditionally Wesern religious language as a human like supreme being.

Coyne and Douthat are both very accomplished writers and have and own the theater in which to stage this drama. But neither of them seems capable to me of stepping back and accepting that language itself limits how and what we say, and certainly biases in the mind of the “hearer” the content.

I’ll retreat to my usual ancient Taoist, Hindu and Greek position of god both is and is not, neither is nor is not, because ‘god’ is simply a word bantered around as the accepted name for what is yet not known.

whim New York, NY

There is no need at all for an atheist, or a materialist, to be an ‘eliminativist’, relegating all talk of mentality and values to unreality.

If Ross Douthat exists, and his attempts at reasoning exist, and his passions exist, and everything that exists is matter in motion, then Ross Douthat and his attempts at reasoning and his passions are matter in motion, or properties thereof. That does not imply that Ross and his thinkings and his wantings are unreal.

That an adequate description or explanation of everything can be given in terms from physics is obviously false–we need not reach the mental or the normative to see this, the biological will do nicely. Adequate explanations in biology rely on the notion of function, which is not a term from physics.’Neuronal network’ is not a term from physics. Nor is a neural network composed of anything non-physical.

Human beings are required by their circumstances to choose what to go for, what to believe, what to do. Justification is an ineliminable feature of our lives. Douthat and Coyne share understandings of how arguments are to be evaluated. Rationality, rather than divinity, accounts for this. And rationality is a far cry, as giving warrant to our choosings and valuings, from any arbitrary existential choice ex nihilo.

Coyne’s speaking of an “illusory” self is charitably understood as the claim that we are not what many of us take ourselves to be, not that we do not exist–an incoherent claim for anyone to make.

Scott Butler Newport News, VA

Over-confidence would seem to apply to advocates of all systems of thought, including Mr. Douthat’s Catholicism. Mr. Douthat more or less presents Mr. Coyne as a representative of all “secularists,” although he calls him “a certain type of atheistic polemicist.” This stereotyping of secularists as arrogant and irrational is a way of not fully engaging the obvious objection to a religious perspective that Mr. Coyne makes: no evidence. If the universe is a manifestation of divinity, that divinity doesn’t appear to be the loving, just, and merciful God of traditional Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, at least not as revealed in the indifferent interplay of natural forces. Cosmology clearly does not have a “surface compatibility with moral realism.” Where does morality come from, then? Us. Does that cut it off from ultimate meaning? Not from ultimate human meaning, I think. We are our own work in progress, whether we admit it or not. Are we “neuronal illusions,” as Mr. Coyne proposes? I don’t know, but the universe is a profound mystery that religion tends to explain too glibly and to trivialize.

EB AZ
Douthat says that for secular naturalists, human consciousness is “probably an illusion.”

Is that the claim, though? I am aware of the claim that the self is an illusion, but that’s not the same thing.

If I stare at a green spot and then turn my gaze to a white surface, I may see something red there. The red spot is an illusion. My eyes are giving me an erroneous message. But my eyesight is not an illusion.

The same thing with the self and consciousness. The message that my consciousness gives me, that I have a self, is arguably erroneous. But that is not to say that my consciousness itself is an illusion.

mmwhite San Diego, CA

“For a man who believes in “a physical and purposeless universe” with no room for teleology, Coyne seems remarkably confident about what direction human history is going in, and where it will end up. ”

He probably did what scientists do – looked at the data he had available (the record of human history to date) and projected a trend. While history has been erratic, there has been a general trend towards increasing respect for and tolerance of people who are “other” – other races, other beliefs, other genders, etc. This shows up most clearly in how we treat others (so we no longer torture and kill those who believe differently, we have given the same rights to women as to men, to the descendants of slaves as to the descendants of the wealthy, to those with physical and mental handicaps as to the robustly healthy). And in treating these “others” as worthy of decency, we have learned there are other ways of viewing the world, which may

be at least as correct as our own (I notice Mr. Douthat does not consider any of the myriad of non-Abrahamic religions – don’t they count?)

There has also been a trend to using information supplied by careful observation of the world and logical thought about it to determine what things mean and how they should be done. I don’t think it’s to difficult to put these together to project a trend to a secular, science- (or at least reason-) based society.

“Purposeless” doesn’t mean “utterly random with no connection to what has gone on before”. Luke Grand Rapids MI

How ironic that Douthat criticizes naturalism for having relativistic morality in contrast to.,…. western theism? is he joking? Show me how Yaweh demonstrated a consistent understanding of “thou shalt not kill”. Does that include Amalekites? the babies in Jericho? slaves? Job’s family? Isaac? Materialism in contrast renders morality objective in many instances. I can defend “thou shalt not kill” on the principle of non-contradiction: its wrong to commit a course of action that you would not want done to yourself. There you go: objective.

From a purely empirical level, Douthat also has problems. Why are atheists moral then if they shouldn’t have any objective basis. He mentions the hiding of Jews from Nazis. According to Oliner and Oliner’s study of rescuers, religion was not a predictor. Or rather, it was a curved relationship: those who were both highly religious as well as completely nonreligious were most likely to rescue with the middle of religiosity least likely. Again i ask: what is this evidence that religion in this case provided an objective moral basis that materialism did not?

CastleMan Colorado

What difference does your personal world view make, in terms of what’s actually real? Evolution has happened on Earth, and will keep happening, regardless of whether you think it is real or imagined. As Professor Coyne notes, we are, as far as we know, the only intelligent beings in a cold, dark, and brutally cold universe. We have no proof at all that any god, whether the Christian one or any other, exists. The logical conclusion is that we must derive purpose from our existence; no other force that could create one, or did create one, has done it for us. Again, whether you believe in a god, or God, has nothing to do with what we KNOW. Yes, it’s obvious that we don’t know all about the universe or even about the history of life on this planet, but what we do know indicates pretty clearly that religion is a form of mythology and not a reflection of reality.

Arthur UWS, NYC

” At which point the entire edifice suddenly looks terribly wobbly — because who, exactly, is doing all of this forging and shaping and purpose-creating if Jerry Coyne, as I understand him (and I assume he understands himself) quite possibly does not actually exist at all?”-Douthat

I suggest that Douthat kick Jerry Coyne, as Dr. Johnson kicked a rock to refute Bishop Berkely, assertion of the non-existence of matter. Alternately, Jerry Coyne thinks, as does Douthat, therefore he exist, as per Blaise Pascal. If one has to posit a religion to accept existence, then

the argument becomes an argument pitting one world view against another, with no possibility of resolution.

I read Douthat’s Christmas column and found it unfathomable, in part, because we do share the same world views. I will grant that the creche glorifies family, an important social institution or construct, but I could not see how the creche supported democracy. In fact, I take the creche as just as much the glorification of a mother goddess, although a peculiar one.

John F. McBride Seattle gemli°Boston

I agree with your assessment of the retreat of religion and the advance of science; when I began the process of withdrawing from religion decades ago a major factor was its unwillingness to surrender positions, for instance in the forced recantation of Galileo, that were factually disproven.

I don’t possess the expectation for science to have all the answers, and in that I include the works of great sociologists and psychologists, such as Ernest Becker (Denial of Death, The Birth and Death of Meaning), as well as the hard sciences.

But their explanations, and attempts to find further, research underwritten explanations, make more sense to me than a bishop in Rome asserting the sinfulness of birth control in the face of humanity’s problems and basing that “sin” on…. ? What exactly?

Still, I don’t expect, let alone demand, the unconditional withdrawal and surrender of religion; and without attempting to attribute any personal description to the phenomenon of “existence,” there is a quantum aspect of coming into that existence, and “measuring into specific behaviors in reaction to experience” [nuerophysiologically we select in experience from openness to wide ranges of sounds, etc. into specific language, culture, etc) that fascinates me and that leaves open in my mind “phenomenon” ( de Chardin) that lies outside experience and measurement, and therefore religion and science.

Therein is a great conversation, and not one exhibited in this column. Brad Foley Los Angeles, CA

I feel very little sympathy for Coyne as a human being (either in his old role as a serious scientist, or his new role as self-anointed apostle of atheism). But despite his interpersonal failings, he’s more often than not right. And this case seems to be no exception. To respond to Douthat’s confusion about the atheistic foundation of morality – there’s a perfectly acceptable evolutionary logic underlying Coyne’s claims here. It’s possible he didn’t feel the need to belabor it in the particular post at question, because it’s a very well known argument.

First: our nature has been shaped by evolution (you can interject your favourite blind/cold/ nihilistic adjective here).

Second: Humans have evolved in groups, and in groups the most cooperative, “moral”, individuals prospered. (This is not an article of faith, this is an experimentally tractable premise).

Third: Many of our most deep-seated moral instincts and preferences are thus the product of evolution. Not ‘right’ in any cosmic sense, but real nonetheless (like our predilection for sweets, or bacon).

If we innately enjoy being in cooperative groups, and thrive in these groups, it’s perfectly logical to claim this is a foundation for morality. Much the same way we can say, if we like food, farming is a great thing to encourage in our society. Shifting the explanation from “evolution made us this way” to “God made us this way” really gains us nothing in logical power.

JPalkki South Range

Purpose? Morals? We made them, whether they are in the religious texts or in our own minds. We each interpret them according to own thinking or we defer to someone else’s purpose or morals.

If Mr. Douthat is incapable of coming to his own version then I would say he has become the one of the sheep following someone else’s versions and really should not criticize a person like Mr. Coyne. At least Mr. Coyne invested some time thinking about it.

Lambert McLaurin Pittsboro, NC 25312

Ross appears to have done his job as columnist very well. I am certainly not smart enough to wade into this discussion, but it is one of the better conversations I have read in a long time. His writing seems to have both stimulated people to think and to write clearly. I learned so much from actually reading the postings. I am not sure that any of this information will change my own views, but they have given me

David Appell Salem, OR

Ross doesn’t get it: Some of us think we can’t believe in any “gods” while, at the same time, being intellectually honest with ourselves.

We are scientific materialists because there is no other honest choice.

January 08, 2014 Brain on Metaphors

                                                                                       Click here for a pdf version

This Is Your Brain on Metaphors

By ROBERT SAPOLSKY

Despite rumors to the contrary, there are many ways in which the human brain isn’t all that fancy. Let’s compare it to the nervous system of a fruit fly. Both are made up of cells, of course, with neurons playing particularly important roles. Now one might expect that a neuron from a human will differ dramatically from one from a fly. Maybe the human’s will have especially ornate ways of communicating with other neurons, making use of unique “neurotransmitter” messengers. Maybe compared to the lowly fly neuron, human neurons are bigger, more complex, in some way can run faster and jump higher.

We study hard to get admitted to a top college to get a good job to get into the nursing home of our choice. Gophers don’t do that.

But no. Look at neurons from the two species under a microscope and they look the same. They have the same electrical properties, many of the same neurotransmitters, the same protein channels that allow ions to flow in and out, as well as a remarkably high number of genes in common. Neurons are the same basic building blocks in both species.

So where’s the difference? It’s numbers — humans have roughly one million neurons for each one in a fly. And out of a human’s 100 billion neurons emerge some pretty remarkable things. With enough quantity, you generate quality.

Neuroscientists understand the structural bases of some of these qualities. Take language, that uniquely human behavior. Underlining it are structures unique to the human brain — regions like “Broca’s area,” which specializes in language production. Then there’s the brain’s “extrapyramidal system,” which is involved in fine motor control. The complexity of the human version allows us to do something that, say, a polar bear, could never accomplish — sufficiently independent movement of digits to play a trill on the piano, for instance. Particularly striking is the human frontal cortex. While occurring in all mammals, the human version is proportionately bigger and denser in its wiring. And what is the frontal cortex good for? Emotional regulation, gratification postponement, executive decision-making, long-term planning. We study hard in high school to get admitted to a top college to get into grad school to get a good job to get into the nursing home of our choice. Gophers don’t do that.

There’s another domain of unique human skills, and neuroscientists are learning a bit about how the brain pulls it off.

Consider the following from J. Ruth Gendler’s wonderful “The Book of Qualities,” a collection of “character sketches” of different qualities, emotions and attributes:

Anxiety is secretive. He does not trust anyone, not even his friends, Worry, Terror, Doubt and Panic … He likes to visit me late at night when I am alone and exhausted. I have never slept with him, but he kissed me on the forehead once, and I had a headache for two years …

Compassion speaks with a slight accent. She was a vulnerable child, miserable in school, cold, shy … In ninth grade she was befriended by Courage. Courage lent Compassion bright sweaters, explained the slang, showed her how to play volleyball.

What is Gendler going on about? We know, and feel pleasure triggered by her unlikely juxtapositions. Despair has stopped listening to music. Anger sharpens kitchen knives at the local supermarket. Beauty wears a gold shawl and sells seven kinds of honey at the flea market. Longing studies archeology.

Symbols, metaphors, analogies, parables, synecdoche, figures of speech: we understand them. We understand that a captain wants more than just hands when he orders all of them on deck. We understand that Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” isn’t really about a cockroach. If we are of a certain theological ilk, we see bread and wine intertwined with body and blood. We grasp that the right piece of cloth can represent a nation and its values, and that setting fire to such a flag is a highly charged act. We can learn that a certain combination of sounds put together by Tchaikovsky represents Napoleon getting his butt kicked just outside Moscow. And that the name “Napoleon,” in this case, represents thousands and thousands of soldiers dying cold and hungry, far from home.

And we even understand that June isn’t literally busting out all over. It would seem that doing this would be hard enough to cause a brainstorm. So where did this facility with symbolism come from? It strikes me that the human brain has evolved a necessary shortcut for doing so, and with some major implications.

Consider an animal (including a human) that has started eating some rotten, fetid, disgusting food. As a result, neurons in an area of the brain called the insula will activate. Gustatory disgust. Smell the same awful food, and the insula activates as well. Think about what might count as a disgusting food (say, taking a bite out of a struggling cockroach). Same thing.

Now read in the newspaper about a saintly old widow who had her home foreclosed by a sleazy mortgage company, her medical insurance canceled on flimsy grounds, and got a lousy, exploitative offer at the pawn shop where she tried to hock her kidney dialysis machine. You sit there thinking, those bastards, those people are scum, they’re worse than maggots, they make me want to puke … and your insula activates. Think about something shameful and rotten that you once did … same thing. Not only does the insula “do” sensory disgust; it does moral disgust as well. Because the two are so viscerally similar. When we evolved the capacity to be disgusted by moral failures, we didn’t evolve a new brain region to handle it. Instead, the insula expanded its portfolio.

Or consider pain. Somebody pokes your big left toe with a pin. Spinal reflexes cause you to instantly jerk your foot back just as they would in, say, a frog. Evolutionarily ancient regions activate in the brain as well, telling you about things like the intensity of the pain, or whether it’s a sharp localized pain or a diffuse burning one. But then there’s a fancier, more recently evolved brain region in the frontal cortex called the anterior cingulate that’s involved in the subjective, evaluative response to the pain. A piranha has just bitten you? That’s a disaster. The shoes you bought are a size too small? Well, not as much of a disaster.

Now instead, watch your beloved being poked with the pin. And your anterior cingulate will activate, as if it were you in pain. There’s a neurotransmitter called Substance P that is involved in the nuts and bolts circuitry of pain perception. Administer a drug that blocks the actions of Substance P to people who are clinically depressed, and they often feel better, feel less of the world’s agonies. When humans evolved the ability to be wrenched with feeling the pain of others, where was it going to process it? It got crammed into the anterior cingulate. And thus it “does” both physical and psychic pain.

Another truly interesting domain in which the brain confuses the literal and metaphorical is cleanliness. In a remarkable study, Chen-Bo Zhong of the University of Toronto and Katie Liljenquist of Northwestern University demonstrated how the brain has trouble distinguishing between being a dirty scoundrel and being in need of a bath. Volunteers were asked to recall either a moral or immoral act in their past. Afterward, as a token of appreciation, Zhong and Liljenquist offered the volunteers a choice between the gift of a pencil or of a package of antiseptic wipes. And the folks who had just wallowed in their ethical failures were more likely to go for the wipes. In the next study, volunteers were told to recall an immoral act of theirs. Afterward, subjects either did or did not have the opportunity to clean their hands. Those who were able to wash were less likely to respond to a request for help (that the experimenters had set up) that came shortly afterward. Apparently, Lady Macbeth and Pontius Pilate weren’t the only ones to metaphorically absolve their sins by washing their hands.

This potential to manipulate behavior by exploiting the brain’s literal-metaphorical confusions about hygiene and health is also shown in a study by Mark Landau and Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas and Jeff Greenberg of the University of Arizona. Subjects either did or didn’t read an article about the health risks of airborne bacteria. All then read a history article that used imagery of a nation as a living organism with statements like, “Following the Civil War, the United States underwent a growth spurt.” Those who read about scary bacteria before thinking about the U.S. as an organism were then more likely to express negative views about immigration.

Another example of how the brain links the literal and the metaphorical comes from a study by Lawrence Williams of the University of Colorado and John Bargh of Yale. Volunteers would meet one of the experimenters, believing that they would be starting the experiment shortly. In reality, the experiment began when the experimenter, seemingly struggling with an armful of folders, asks the volunteer to briefly hold their coffee. As the key experimental manipulation, the coffee was either hot or iced. Subjects then read a description of some individual, and those who had held the warmer cup tended to rate the individual as having a warmer personality, with no change in ratings of other attributes.

Another brilliant study by Bargh and colleagues concerned haptic sensations (I had to look the word up — haptic: related to the sense of touch). Volunteers were asked to evaluate the resumes of supposed job applicants where, as the critical variable, the resume was attached to a clipboard of one of two different weights. Subjects who evaluated the candidate while holding the heavier clipboard tended to judge candidates to be more serious, with the weight of the clipboard having no effect on how congenial the applicant was judged. After all, we say things like “weighty matter” or “gravity of a situation.”

What are we to make of the brain processing literal and metaphorical versions of a concept in the same brain region? Or that our neural circuitry doesn’t cleanly differentiate between the real and the symbolic? What are the consequences of the fact that evolution is a tinkerer and not an inventor, and has duct-taped metaphors and symbols to whichever pre-existing brain areas provided the closest fit?

Jonathan Haidt, of the University of Virginia, has shown how viscera and emotion often drive our decisionmaking, with conscious cognition mopping up afterward, trying to come up with rationalizations for that gut decision. The viscera that can influence moral decisionmaking and the brain’s confusion about the literalness of symbols can have enormous consequences. Part of the emotional contagion of the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda arose from the fact that when militant Hutu propagandists called for the eradication of the Tutsi, they iconically referred to them as “cockroaches.” Get someone to the point where his insula activates at the mention of an entire people, and he’s primed to join the bloodletting.
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But if the brain confusing reality and literalness with metaphor and symbol can have adverse consequences, the opposite can occur as well. At one juncture just before the birth of a free South Africa, Nelson Mandela entered secret negotiations with an Afrikaans general with death squad blood all over his hands, a man critical to the peace process because he led a large, well-armed Afrikaans resistance group. They met in Mandela’s house, the general anticipating tense negotiations across a conference table. Instead, Mandela led him to the warm, homey living room, sat beside him on a comfy couch, and spoke to him in Afrikaans. And the resistance melted away.

This neural confusion about the literal versus the metaphorical gives symbols enormous power, including the power to make peace. The political scientist and game theorist Robert Axelrod of the University of Michigan has emphasized this point in thinking about conflict resolution. For example, in a world of sheer rationality where the brain didn’t confuse reality with symbols, bringing peace to Israel and Palestine would revolve around things like water rights, placement of borders, and the extent of militarization allowed to Palestinian police. Instead, argues Axelrod, “mutual symbolic concessions” of no material benefit will ultimately make all the difference. He quotes a Hamas leader who says that for the process of peace to go forward, Israel must apologize for the forced Palestinians exile in 1948. And he quotes a senior Israeli official saying that for progress to be made, Palestinians need to first acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and to get their anti-Semitic garbage out of their textbooks.

Hope for true peace in the Middle East didn’t come with the news of a trade agreement being signed. It was when President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan attended the funeral of the murdered Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. That same hope came to the Northern Irish, not when ex-Unionist demagogues and ex-I.R.A. gunmen served in a government together, but when those officials publicly commiserated about each other’s family misfortunes, or exchanged anniversary gifts. And famously, for South Africans, it came not with successful negotiations about land reapportionment, but when black South Africa embraced rugby and Afrikaans rugby jocks sang the A.N.C. national anthem.

Nelson Mandela was wrong when he advised, “Don’t talk to their minds; talk to their hearts.” He meant talk to their insulas and cingulate cortices and all those other confused brain regions, because that confusion could help make for a better world.

Robert Sapolsky is John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Professor of Biology, Neurology and Neurosurgery at Stanford University, and is a research associate at the Institute of Primate Research, National Museums of Kenya. He writes frequently on issues related to biology and behavior. His books include “Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers,” “A Primate’s Memoir,” and “Monkeyluv.”
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salgadoce  North America
It’s great that we can have a scientific account of how people reason and make decisions and perceive intention and metaphors, etc. I’m all for cognitive neuroscience elucidating the ‘how’ of the mind.

But, as you mention, the people who come to understand the mind and its insulas and cingulate cortices can then use this knowledge to manipulate the minds of others in both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ways; you can either be a force of good, like Mandela; or a force of bad/evil, like Hitler or Bagosora.

Ultimately, the only way this type of cognitive insight is going to be of any use for the world is if it is put to use by *good* people – people who are noble, benevolent, virtuous, even kind-hearted.

Until science can find a way to talk about what is good, what is moral, what is noble, what is valuable – the questions that, so far, only traditional, ‘super-scientific’ philosophy has been able to address – I believe Nelson Mandela is actually ‘righter’ and wiser than you think when he says that we must speak and listen to our hearts, for speaking to a person’s mind can be effective and create a better world only if the *speaker’s* heart is pure and imbued with love.

pgm3    Cambridge, UK
All language, including mathematics, is metaphor. A “tree” doesn’t know it is a tree, and “running” is just two sounds we use to invoke an image of ongoing movement. I have thus always been a bit puzzled by the concept of the logical fallacy known as “arguing from analogy”. While it is true that the concept of a circle necessarilly engages also the concept of, say, Pi, it also true that no falling object
“knows” that it should fall in a parabolic trajectory; this is simply our way of expressing what we observe in the most general terms. Every description of the a posteriori universe is just that, a description, and that involves a degree of approximation. Rational thought is in fact the art of thinking in ratios, in comparisons of one thing in terms of its proportion to another.

Josh Josephs   London
This piece is a very astute analysis, expounding in modern empirical scientific terminology, Locke’s theory of associations. However, this standpoint, that we are somehow driven by metaphorical associations because we mix them up with reality, does a great disservice to humanity. Our actions become driven merely by emotional confusions, consisting of our conflated desires and repulsions. This somehow diminishes or overlooks the intrinsic values that we place on those objects and aspirations that have importance to ourselves as reflecting deeply on our values.

The Afrikaans general who willingly came to an agreement with Nelson Mandela in the homey comfortable of a well-designed living room, probably did not do so just because his hard heart was so easily melted. Rather, he was able to arrive at a certain intellectual conciliation and meeting of ideas for which the living room served as a setting where this could come to a resolution. To pretend that the setting was somehow the cause rather than the diplomatic lubricant is to overlook the intensity and depth of ideological divisions. A policy that would somehow derive from this theory would end up trying to bring world peace via the manipulations of symbols hoping to stir up emotions of universal love.

The purposeful drawing of symbols with the sole purpose of invoking emotions is manipulation of course. The whole hope that lies in humanity is that we are not just creatures that can find ourselves moved only by emotional manipulation of sorts. We must believe that there are values that we hold to for their own sake, because we have understood these and understood that these are true and that these are worthy of our commitment. The symbols should just be the signs that reflect our better judgment and not the other way around. This is not to say that there are not people who are easily manipulated through the emotional call of symbols, since some of the worst depredations of the last century have clearly demonstrated that this tendency is real. Only that we can only have enduring belief and trust in our humanity if we know that we are able to be guided by reasoned judgment that can assess and reconcile values and ideas and not just be moved by emotional confusions.

Sal Anthony    Queens, NY
Dear Professor Sapolsky,
A wonderful essay but for the notion that confusion reigns in the realm of mind. As Lao Tzu said, whether a man dispassionately sees to the core of life or passionately sees the surface makes no difference, for the core and the surface are essentially the same, words only making them appear different. Similarly, it was Nietzsche who said that for the mighty oak to scrape the sky with its branches it must sink its roots deep into the bowels of the earth.

All creatures great and small arose from that primordial stew, so why should it seem odd that we confuse the metaphorical with the literal – it was the literal that brought us into being and roused us into consciousness. Whether guided by a creator or not, it was the material world that conferred the infrastructure for our mighty minds, so why expect a differentiation that shouldn’t exist?

Real confusion attends whenever we try to fix things without taking our origins into account, by seeking solutions for rational automatons who don’t exist, instead of recognizing our nature and acting in accordance with it, at least, to the extent our addled, emotionally-driven, mixed-up-metaphor selves can manage.

Patricia   Pasadena, CA
Nice article. Except the Romans did not wash their hands to absolve their sins. And Pilate wouldn’t have thought he was sinning. He was executing a man who had broken the most important rule of the reign of Emperor Tiberius — the failure to acknowledge Tiberius as a god. Pilate would not have thought that executing such a man was a sin. To Pilate that would have been the essence of Roman cleanliness and piety. An act of cleansing for the Empire itself.
As for averting warfare in light of our history – good luck with that.

fleep   Los Angeles, California
Among the things ‘duct taped’ to the human brain is the symbolic act of civic governance. We don’t have an archetype called “President of the United States” in our brains, but we do have something called “daddy.” Our obsession with calling the people who started this country the “Founding Fathers,” and the need to call Washington “the father of our country,” is about taking the very new concept of elected government and wiring it to the dominant alpha male perceptor in our heads.

The past two years have been about certain brains in this country reacting viscerally to an alpha male that doesn’t look like their daddy. It’s couched in phrases like ‘losing our freedoms.’ it is unsettling to them in ways that transcend coherent thought or debate. And for that single reason, I have a drop or two of compassion in my heart for those so visibly upset.

MKK  Indianapolis, IN
The personality currently using this to greatest effect is Sarah Palin. I really hate that woman, but her “momma grizzly” pitch is brilliant. Every mother has had a “Momma Grizzly” moment, and it is one of the most viceral reactions you can experience. When she uses those words, that same feeling makes you think you need to start protecting something. It takes a couple of seconds to realize it is just Sarah crying wolf again, trying to stir the pot about something.

casey   Ohio

Susan Sontag’s “Illness as Metaphor” brilliantly illuminates the danger of figurative language. She observed that cancer in the late 19th early 20th century become a metaphor for death, which is not terribly encouraging for those who receive a cancer diagnosis. She also notes the sometime- ugly consequences of false correlations between certain illnesses and certain personality types. For example, tuberculosis was seen as a disease characteristic of the poetic and sensitive type — John Keats, for example. It thus became associated with beauty. Therefore a 19th-century man might almost desire to have a consumptive, invalid wife. Tuberculosis, of course, is anything but beautiful; a death via TB is typically messy, agonizing — generally horrible. Once the true cause of TB was discovered, its metaphoric status quickly changed, just as cancer’s metaphoric status is slowly changing as our treatments for it become more effective.

Another example of a misuse of metaphor: the “War” on Terror. Terrorism is a tactic; it has always existed, it always will exist. It cannot be defeated in the way an army or a government can be defeated. The use of metaphor in this case, then, is misleading and potentially pernicious. Same with the “War” on drugs. To call it a “war” is to call up romantic associations with patriotism, honor, glory, etc. It assists those in whose interest it is to keep this pointless government activity going, despite its utter failure to erode drug use and the tremendous cost, both monetary and moral. No one involved in a war wants to “surrender,” after all. It’s shameful.

December 11, 2013 The Great Divide

                                                                                       Click here for a pdf version

Great Divide:  Rich People Just Care Less

By DANIEL GOLEMAN

Turning a blind eye. Giving someone the cold shoulder. Looking down on people. Seeing right through them.

These metaphors for condescending or dismissive behavior are more than just descriptive. They suggest, to a surprisingly accurate extent, the social distance between those with greater power and those with less — a distance that goes beyond the realm of interpersonal interactions and may exacerbate the soaring inequality in the United States.

A growing body of recent research shows that people with the most social power pay scant attention to those with little such power. This tuning out has been observed, for instance, with strangers in a mere five-minute get-acquainted session, where the more powerful person shows fewer signals of paying attention, like nodding or laughing. Higher-status people are also more likely to express disregard, through facial expressions, and are more likely to take over the conversation and interrupt or look past the other speaker.

Bringing the micropolitics of interpersonal attention to the understanding of social power, researchers are suggesting, has implications for public policy.

Of course, in any society, social power is relative; any of us may be higher or lower in a given interaction, and the research shows the effect still prevails. Though the more powerful pay less attention to us than we do to them, in other situations we are relatively higher on the totem pole of status — and we, too, tend to pay less attention to those a rung or two down.

A prerequisite to empathy is simply paying attention to the person in pain. In 2008, social psychologists from the University of Amsterdam and the University of California, Berkeley, studied pairs of strangers telling one another about difficulties they had been through, like a divorce or death of a loved one. The researchers found that the differential expressed itself in the playing down of suffering. The more powerful were less compassionate toward the hardships described by the less powerful. Dacher Keltner, a professor of psychology at Berkeley, and Michael W. Kraus, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, have done much of the research on social power and the attention deficit.

Mr. Keltner suggests that, in general, we focus the most on those we value most. While the wealthy can hire help, those with few material assets are more likely to value their social assets: like the neighbor who will keep an eye on your child from the time she gets home from school until the time you get home from work. The financial difference ends up creating a behavioral difference. Poor people are better attuned to

November 13, 2013 Peacemaker

 Click here for a pdf version

How to become a peacemaker

Four broad, ancient guidelines for human behavior at the heart of every religion.
By James Ishmael Ford
10.14.13

(Note:  Jeannette will bring in a summary of the “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic” though you are encouraged to download it from the link below and review it.)

In 1993, on the one hundredth anniversary of the World Columbian Exposition’s Parliament of the World’s Religions, a second parliament gathered in Chicago. The highlight for many was an address by the Dalai Lama. For me the most important thing to come out of that gathering was a document, Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (PDF).” The principal author was the Rev. Hans Küng, a Roman Catholic priest and scholar. I once heard Küng, a controversial figure within his church, described as the Catholic Church’s finest Lutheran theologian—which is, perhaps, a way of acknowledging that he is one of the ecumenical Christian community’s finest minds.

The document was signed by 200 religious leaders, including the Rev. Dr. Robert Traer of the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches in the United Kingdom. It asserted there are “four broad, ancient guidelines for human behavior which are found in most of the religions of the world,” which it listed as “irrevocable directives” for those who would find peace for the planet.

These irrevocable directives are: 1) a commitment to a culture of nonviolence and respect for life; 2) a commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order; 3) a commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness; and 4) a commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women.

I’m deeply moved by this analysis, which I think cuts through the fog of the conservative part of religions, that part which is meant to sustain and transmit a particular culture—defining inside and outside, us and them—and which is so often used as a club to beat people into conformity. Instead, the directives point to the radical heart of pretty much all religions, that part which opens us to the finest of what it means to be human.

The first of the directives, the first grand intuition of our deep humanity, is that in spite of our natural proclivities to violence, there is a better way. The second tells us we are genuinely responsible for each other. The third points to our need for broad tolerance, which is found within our commitment to genuine honesty with ourselves and with each other. And, finally, the fourth—so buried in so many religions, but implicit at their heart—reminds us that women and men need each other, and can only heal from the wounds of life when we see we are all in it together as equals. (I would add that the issues of sexual minorities are bound up with this last assertion, inevitably, inextricably.)

These four directives offer a life of authenticity and truth and a way of healing for hearts and a world torn by strife. For me there’s a next step that takes this document and its four irrevocables from ink on paper (or pixels on a screen) into our actual lives. There is a Japanese saying, gyogaku funi, which means “practice and study are not two.” And it is here I find myself thinking of Bernie Glassman.

Bernie is one of those characters who steps on the scene, and after they pass through, everything is a bit different. He originally was meant to be a rocket scientist, earning a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from UCLA. He did some of that rocket work. While at grad school, however, he met the Japanese Zen missionary Taizan Maezumi. Eventually Bernie became the Zen master’s first American dharma successor. He would go on to have an unconventional Zen career, first as a pretty conventional Zen priest and teacher, but then dropping the priest part, putting on a clown nose, literally going to clown school, and calling on people to lighten up. From there he went on to various social justice-oriented projects, including the Greyston Foundation, a Zen center that has evolved into a social service agency focused on the needs of the homeless and hungry. He is also deeply focused on issues of peace and peacemaking.

In service of that goal Bernie and his then spouse Sandra Jishu Holmes took those four irrevocable directives from the world parliament to heart and created what is now called the Zen Peacemakers. Along the way he reframed the directives as four commitments. And they’ve caught on. I would say most people aware of these four things think they came from Bernie’s fruitful heart. My own Zen community, Boundless Way Zen, which has no connection to Bernie, has incorporated these commitments into the vows we take when we formally undertake a spiritual life.

As the leader says in the ceremony for our Zen community, “The wheel of the dharma turns and turns. Each generation manifests the great way. Today we commit ourselves to the way of awakening, manifesting as peacemakers in a world torn by strife.” It’s time to step up to the plate. It’s time to do things.

Then, in the ceremony, the new initiate on the way responds together with all those who’ve made the commitment before, “I commit myself to a culture of nonviolence and reverence for life; I commit myself to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order; I commit myself to a culture of tolerance and a life based on truthfulness; and I commit myself to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women.”

Bernie’s gift to us wasn’t just grabbing these four insights and pitching them to the world, but rather finding a clear, if not easy, path to their realization. Study and practice as one thing. He took something from the standard Japanese-derived Zen initiation ceremony, called the Three Pure Precepts, and reframed them as guidance for people of any and perhaps of no spiritual tradition, inviting us to plunge into the unknown, to bear witness to the pain and joy of the world, and to strive to heal oneself and the world.

The call is to become peacemakers.

Let me repeat the method: plunge into the unknown. Bear witness to the pain and the joy of the world. Strive to heal oneself and the world. I think of the first two as invitations into the very heart of life; the third—healing, for myself and for the world—grows out of them as if through a secret alchemical formula. Plunge into the unknown, bear witness to the world’s pain and joy, that you may bring healing. This is how we become peacemakers.

Adapted from “Plunging Into the Unknown: How to be a Peacemaker in a World Torn by Strife,” a sermon preached to First Unitarian Church of Providence, Rhode Island, September 22, 2013 (Monkey Mind).

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